Most Ukrainians want to build a future in Ukraine and believe in victory - poll
Kyiv • UNN
83% of Ukrainians want to link their lives with Ukraine, although this figure has decreased. 73% of respondents believe in victory over Russia.
As of August 2025, 83% of citizens want to link their lives with Ukraine. This figure decreased by 6 points compared to the beginning of the full-scale invasion. At the same time, 73% of respondents maintain faith in victory over Russia, according to the results of a survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Center, reported by UNN.
Survey results
According to the survey results, "compared to the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the share of respondents who would like to build their future life in Ukraine has slightly decreased – by 6 percentage points."
As indicated, this is due to a parallel increase in the share of respondents who would not like to build their future life in Ukraine.
Despite this trend, the share of respondents who, as of August 2025, would like to build their future life in Ukraine, exceeds the figure recorded five years ago by 13 percentage points: 83% in 2025 versus 70% in 2020
According to researchers, there is no statistically significant gender difference among respondents in their desire to build their future life in Ukraine.
80% of men and 85% of women would like to build their future life in Ukraine. 12% of men and 10% of women would not like to build their future life in Ukraine
The older the respondents, the more often they reported a desire to build their future life in Ukraine.
If among young people aged 18–29, 71% want to stay in the country, then in the 40–49 age group this figure is 82.5%, and among people aged 60 and older – already 91%. At the same time, it is among young people, compared to other age categories, that the share of those who would not like to build their future life in Ukraine is the highest – 19%.
Among respondents aged 40–49, 11% do not wish to build their future life in Ukraine, and among respondents aged 60 and older, only 5% do not wish to do so.
Regional distribution
The regional distribution shows that the largest share of respondents who would like to build their future life in Ukraine live in the central (85%) and western (85%) regions, and the lowest – in the southern (78%) and eastern (77%) regions.
In the remaining regions, the share of respondents who would not like to build their future life in Ukraine fluctuates at 9–10%, in the eastern regions it reaches 19%. The level of well-being of respondents practically did not affect their desire to build their future in Ukraine.
Dominant feelings of respondents when they think about the future of Ukraine
The dominant feelings among respondents when they think about the future of Ukraine are hope (58%), anxiety (43%), and optimism (28%).
Compared to the beginning of the full-scale invasion, respondents less often reported feelings of optimism (-12%) and hope (-7%) and more often – confusion (+12%), anxiety (+12%), and fear (+8%) when thinking about the future of Ukraine
At the same time, if compared with data before the full-scale invasion, five years ago the share of respondents who felt optimism and confusion when thinking about the future of Ukraine was the same as today, researchers indicate. At the same time, the share of respondents who feel hope (+15%), anxiety (+15%), and fear (+12.5%) has increased.
If we compare with data from twenty years ago, in 2005, after the Orange Revolution, the share of respondents who feel optimism and hope when thinking about the future of Ukraine is similar, but today the share of respondents who feel anxiety (+19%), fear (+13%), and confusion (+11%) has increased
They also emphasize that throughout most of the 20-year monitoring of this issue, "hope, optimism, and anxiety remained the dominant feelings regarding the country's future."
The exception was 2013, when respondents, in addition to hope and anxiety, began to mention fear more often than optimism. Also among the exceptions is the period from 2014 to 2016 - then the share of those who felt fear gradually decreased, and the share of those who felt optimism gradually increased, returning to the traditional trio of "hope-anxiety-optimism."
Over the past two years, in 2024 and 2025, the share of respondents who feel fear when thinking about the country's future is again returning to the levels of 2013–2016
Among men and women, the share of respondents who experience certain feelings about the future of Ukraine, offered to them in the questionnaire, are generally similar, the authors add. However, "women were 10% more likely than men to report fear for the country's future."
Young people, compared to respondents in the oldest age group, more often felt optimism (+9%), confidence (+8%), and less often anxiety (-9%), fear (-12%)
Compared to respondents from the central and western regions, respondents from the southern and eastern regions more often reported pessimism (+8%) and less often hope (-19.5%) when thinking about the future of Ukraine.
Financially and materially secure respondents, compared to those living below the poverty line, more often felt positive emotions about the country's future, such as optimism (+13%), hope (+13%), and confidence (+13%), and less often felt negative emotions such as fear (-11%) and anxiety (-16%).
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73% of respondents continue to believe in Ukraine's victory
The absolute majority of respondents (73%) continue to believe in Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia. 17% of respondents do not believe in victory. A significant shift in belief in Ukraine's victory occurred in 2024, when the share of those who believe in Ukraine's victory decreased by 11%.
Over the past year, the decline in belief in Ukraine's victory continued, amounting to 4%, which is only slightly higher than the theoretical sampling error, researchers say.
There is no statistically significant difference between women and men in their belief in Ukraine's victory. At the same time, young people, compared to respondents over 60, more often believed in Ukraine's victory (+8%) due to a lower share of respondents who do not believe in Ukraine's victory (-7%).
The lowest belief in Ukraine's victory is observed among respondents living in the eastern regions: 55.5% believe in victory, 31% do not believe in victory
For comparison, in the southern regions, which are closest to the eastern in terms of respondents' belief in victory, 69% believe in victory, and 16% do not believe.
For most respondents, the three main signs of Ukraine's victory in the war will be the return of all Ukrainian prisoners, deportees, and abducted persons (37%), the preservation of Ukrainian statehood (31%), and the cessation of missile attacks on Ukraine (30%).
27% of respondents reported the liberation of Ukrainian territories within the 1991 borders. The least significant signs of Ukraine's victory in the war among those offered to respondents were the failure of the Russian offensive and stabilization of the front (12%), confiscation and transfer to Ukraine of arrested Russian assets and funds (12%), and the continuation of international sanctions against Russia (11%)
If a referendum on the declaration of state independence of Ukraine were held today
If a referendum on the declaration of state independence of Ukraine were held today, the absolute majority of respondents (82%) would support independence. 3% would not support Ukraine's independence.
Compared to the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the share of respondents who would support Ukraine's independence decreased by 5% due to an increase in the share of those who would not participate in the referendum.
However, compared to 2019, the share of respondents who would vote for the declaration of Ukraine's independence in a referendum in 2025 is 12% higher, and the share of those who would vote against independence is 6 percentage points lower.
60% of respondents believe that they and their families have benefited more from Ukraine's independence. In contrast, 15% reported that they and their families lost more from the declaration of independence.
Young people were somewhat more likely to agree that they and their families benefited more from Ukraine's declaration of independence than respondents over 60: 61% and 55.5% respectively.
Among respondents from the western regions, 75% believe they benefited from the declaration of independence compared to a median value of 55% for the rest of the regions. 6% of respondents in the western regions believe they lost more from the declaration of independence compared to a median value of 19% among respondents from other regions
Respondents living below the poverty line, unlike those with a better level of well-being, were least convinced that they and their families benefited more from gaining independence (37%), due to a larger share of those who believe they lost from gaining independence (+13%), and those who were undecided on this issue (+11%).
Respondents' conviction in their interest in strengthening Ukraine's independence increased with the growth of subjectivity and proximity to the respondent. The least interested, in the opinion of respondents, were representatives of the Ukrainian authorities and opposition. More interested, according to respondents' assessment, compared to the authorities and opposition, was the population of Ukraine
Compared to the population of Ukraine, "greater interest in strengthening independence, in the opinion of respondents, was shown by the population of the respondent's region." The highest interest in strengthening Ukraine's independence, as reported by respondents, is shown by them personally. Thus, 76% of respondents answered that they personally are largely interested in Ukraine's independence, another 16% – to some extent.
Addition
The all-Ukrainian survey was conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation jointly with the sociological service of the Razumkov Center in the period from August 12 to 18, 2025.
2002 respondents aged 18 and older, residing in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions and the city of Kyiv, were interviewed face-to-face. In Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, Kherson regions – only in those territories controlled by the government of Ukraine and where no hostilities are taking place.
The survey was conducted using a multi-stage sample with random selection at the initial stages and a quota method at the final stage. During the final selection, gender and age quotas were taken into account.
The sample structure corresponds to the demographic characteristics of the adult population of the territories covered by the study as of the beginning of 2022 - by age, gender, and type of settlement. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%.
At the same time, additional systematic deviations of the sample may be caused by the consequences of Russian aggression, in particular, the forced evacuation of millions of citizens.
Composition of macroregions
- West – Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions;
- Center – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions, as well as the city of Kyiv;
- South – Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Odesa regions; East – Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv regions.