Technology between three worlds: how Soviet GOSTs, Ukrainian DSTUs, and NATO standards influence the modernization of the defense sector
Kyiv • UNN
The Ukrainian army uses Soviet equipment, which is repaired according to outdated standards, creating legal uncertainty. The transition from GOSTs to DSTUs and NATO standards complicates the modernization and maintenance of military equipment.
The Ukrainian army still uses Soviet-era equipment, which has to be repaired according to standards that have long been outdated. While Ukrainian legislation is trying to transition from GOSTs to DSTUs and implement NATO requirements, enterprises and the military find themselves trapped between three systems. Due to legal uncertainty, combat vehicles risk being left without weapons, and high-tech solutions without legal status, UNN writes.
Details
After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited a significant amount of Soviet military equipment, the technical operation and repair of which were regulated by GOSTs – interstate standards adopted back in Soviet times. Subsequently, national standards – DSTU (state standards of Ukraine) – began to be introduced, which were gradually supposed to replace the outdated regulatory framework. However, the transition process proved to be complex and protracted: many technical details remain insufficiently regulated, which creates difficulties for enterprises that service outdated but still operational equipment.
For example, in the case of Soviet-made aviation equipment still used by Ukraine, modernization must be agreed with the manufacturer – mostly Russian enterprises, with which cooperation has been terminated. According to the Air Code, the state, represented by the State Aviation Service of Ukraine, has three options: stop the operation of equipment (which is critical for defense), independently authorize maintenance (the optimal option), or grant exclusive rights to one company (which carries risks of monopolization and loss of competition). In practice, there is no clear regulation of the situation.
In addition, Ukraine is already implementing NATO standards, which adds another layer of complexity to technical regulation in the defense industry. The transition to Alliance principles involves not only adapting documentation but also full compatibility of procedures, materials, and approaches to equipment maintenance. Combined with the existing Soviet legacy and legal gaps, this creates a hybrid regulatory zone where enterprises are forced to balance between outdated requirements, manufacturer unavailability, and new international obligations.
Against the backdrop of regulatory uncertainty, practical cases of aircraft repair show the depth of the problem. One of the illustrative cases is the modernization of two Mi-8 combat helicopters, carried out in 2024 by the Ukrainian company LLC "MS AVIA-GRADE". The aircraft were equipped with combat gear and transferred to military units for operation. However, during subsequent major repairs, the installed equipment, despite being under warranty, was dismantled without the installer's participation. Moreover, the equipment was evaluated not according to current Ukrainian standards, but based on outdated technical characteristics of Soviet and Russian GOSTs. As a result, the equipment was deemed "non-authentic" and seized.
This case clearly illustrates the depth of the problem: technical solutions not provided for by outdated GOSTs, but not yet fully regulated within DSTU or NATO standards, find themselves in a "gray area." As a result, the military risks being left without the necessary equipment, and enterprises face additional risks, even when performing work at the highest technological level. And all this also happens in the context of a general trend towards a critical shortage of components for repair, which must be replaced through import substitution, but even here the regulatory path to obtaining permission to use alternative parts often looks like a "mission impossible." As a result, even with technical capabilities, enterprises face barriers in the form of protracted approval procedures and the lack of a flexible mechanism for certifying new solutions.
At the same time, the commander of the Army Aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Pavlo Bardakov, stated that Ukraine does not plan to abandon Soviet-made aviation equipment due to the high level of combat tasks. According to him, Ukraine is simultaneously pursuing two paths: first, obtaining foreign aviation equipment, which is strategic and irreversible, but requires significant time and resources. Second, maintaining the combat readiness of the existing Soviet fleet, its technical maintenance, and modernization.
Thus, without clear rules and flexible procedures, equipment modernization turns into a complex and protracted process that hinders the army's operational efficiency. This is especially true for weapons that are caught between three systems of standards – outdated Soviet GOSTs, partially implemented Ukrainian DSTUs, and new NATO requirements that require full regulatory adaptation. Until the state simplifies and regulates these processes, the military risks being left without the necessary equipment, and enterprises without the ability to work effectively.
Recall
Earlier, the Deputy General Director of the aviation company "Incompass", Andriy Minakov, said that Russia has launched a large-scale campaign to return components that it once exported to dozens of countries around the world. The focus is on parts critical for the repair and maintenance of Soviet-made military equipment. For example, in December 2022, "Uralvagonzavod" bought back tank components from Myanmar that it had previously supplied itself. These were sights and cameras for installation on tanks worth $24 million. They were exported to Myanmar in 2019 and bought back in 2022. In addition, in 2022, the Russian Design Bureau "Mashinostroyeniya" bought six sets for night vision sights for surface-to-air missiles from the Indian Ministry of Defense for $150,000, which were exported to India in 2013. The main goal of these actions is not so much to fill its own shortage as to prevent these samples of equipment or spare parts from falling into Ukraine's hands.