The Kremlin fears elections more than sanctions due to growing internal tension in the Russian Federation - intelligence
Kyiv • UNN
The Foreign Intelligence Service reports that the Kremlin fears the domestic political situation ahead of the State Duma elections. Only 15-24% of Russians support the war, while 64-67% favor peace negotiations.
In the Kremlin, there is growing fear not of international sanctions, but of the domestic political situation ahead of the elections to the Russian State Duma. The Russian authorities are facing increasing public war fatigue and are trying to prevent this discontent from turning into political protest. This was reported by the Foreign Intelligence Service, writes UNN.
It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Kremlin to hide society's war fatigue. Even the sociology controlled by the authorities shows that only 15–24% of Russians support the continuation of hostilities, while 64–67% support peace negotiations. Given the atmosphere of fear in the country, the real level of support for the war may be even lower. On the eve of the September elections to the State Duma, this creates additional risks for the authorities, which even the managed electoral system cannot fully eliminate
As the intelligence service notes, Russian voters formally have a choice, but political competition has been destroyed. Only candidates loyal to the regime are allowed to participate. The detention of Boris Nadezhdin, who in 2024 tried to position himself as an opponent of the war, was indicative. Although he did not pose a real threat to the authorities, he was removed from the current campaign as well. This shows that the Kremlin is afraid not of individual politicians, but of any opportunity to turn public discontent into a political process.
For the Kremlin, the absence of obvious protest leaders is more of a problem than an advantage. A leader can be discredited, arrested, or barred from elections. Without such a leader, the authorities do not understand where the next hotbed of discontent will emerge. Therefore, repression becomes preventive
It is noted that disagreements are also emerging within the elites. Part of Putin's inner circle is calling for a way out of the war before economic and political losses become irreversible. The Central Bank admits that financial stability is incompatible with constant war funding, and oligarchs are establishing separate contacts with Ukraine.
Problems are also accumulating within the state system itself. Russian oil refineries are regularly hit, the fleet is suffering losses, and the temporarily occupied Crimea, after a series of attacks, is turning into an increasingly isolated territory. Against this backdrop, Beijing is preparing for a scenario in which Russia's future will no longer be tied to Putin. Two months remain before the elections, and there are no signs of stabilization.
The situation resembles Belarus in 2020. Then the regime faced mass protests that began with peaceful actions. In Russia, the source of instability may no longer be civilian activists, but hundreds of thousands of war veterans. Many of them did not receive the promised benefits, jobs, or social status. If their disappointment coincides with general discontent in the country, the September 2026 elections could become for the Kremlin not another formality, but a moment when the internal crisis turns into a storm