Missiles targeting factories, fake news against the defense industry: how Russia is trying to weaken Ukraine’s defense-industrial complex
Kyiv • UNN
Russia combines strikes on defense-industry enterprises with campaigns to discredit manufacturers. The manipulations threaten contracts, funding, and weapons production.
While Russia attacks Ukrainian defense enterprises with missiles and drones, manipulations and false accusations against domestic arms manufacturers regularly appear in the information space. Some of these reports are picked up and disseminated within Ukraine, in particular by public figures and politicians. Experts warn that information attacks can have entirely material consequences — from the loss of international contracts to the slowdown of weapons production needed by the Defense Forces of Ukraine. UNN examined how this mechanism works and why information manipulation poses a threat to the development of Ukraine’s defense sector.
Two fronts against Ukraine’s defense industry
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s defense industry has become one of the priority targets of Russian attacks. Enterprises that develop and manufacture UAVs, missiles, ammunition, and other weapons are forced to operate under a constant threat. Manufacturers are dispersing their facilities, strengthening security measures, and at the same time increasing production, on which the supply of the Ukrainian army directly depends.
However, the physical destruction of production is only one of the methods of warfare employed by the Kremlin. Alongside the shelling, an information struggle is underway, aimed at undermining trust in Ukrainian defense companies, discrediting their products, and creating doubts about their ability to fulfill state orders.
If we talk about the current situation, we see two parallel components of this strategy. On the one hand, the Russians are systematically striking Ukrainian defense-industrial enterprises in order to weaken Ukraine’s ability to produce weapons and means of protection. On the other hand, they use information and psychological tools, which are part of the cognitive dimension of modern combat operations
According to the military expert, this strategy is not new. Russia had sought to limit the capabilities of Ukrainian arms manufacturers on international markets long before the full-scale invasion. In particular, through discrediting campaigns, information scandals, and the dissemination of conspiracy theories.
The purpose of such attacks is to reduce Ukraine’s capacity to independently equip its army with modern weapons.
Information warfare as a strategy of Moscow
The fact that information influence can be used to weaken an adversary in parallel with traditional military operations was openly stated by the Russian military leadership long before the start of aggression against Ukraine.
In February 2013, Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, published an article entitled "The Value of Science in Foresight" in the Russian publication "Military-Industrial Courier," devoted to changes in the nature of modern wars. In it, the Russian general emphasized that the boundaries between a state of war and peace were gradually disappearing, while non-military instruments were becoming increasingly important for achieving strategic objectives.
Gerasimov emphasized the growing role of political, economic, information, and humanitarian measures, which could be used in combination with covert military actions and special forces operations. He separately stressed the potential of information confrontation to weaken an adversary.
Information confrontation opens up broad asymmetric opportunities to reduce the combat potential of an adversary
Thus, it is obvious that as early as 2013, the Kremlin viewed information and psychological operations not simply as propaganda, but as a tool capable of reducing an adversary’s combat potential.
Although military analysts at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) noted that this was not an officially approved Russian doctrine, but rather the Russian chief of staff’s view of modern conflicts, the approach described by Gerasimov is precisely what is revealing in the current information attacks on Ukraine’s defense industry.
Russia is using information and psychological operations to discredit arms manufacturers and undermine the trust of international partners so that they reduce funding. This is no longer about influencing public opinion or public sentiment, but about a specific tool for the economic and technological weakening of the state.
The enemy understands that such actions can lead to entirely practical consequences—higher production and development costs, and more time needed to develop and supply certain solutions and components. Moreover, this can lead to the actual displacement from the market of certain developments that genuinely work and give Ukraine a certain advantage
How Russian narratives return to Ukraine’s information space
The distinctive feature of modern information operations is that carrying them out does not always require inventing outright fake news. It may be far more effective to use a real event, an ambiguous statement, or an isolated excerpt from an interview that, after its context is changed, compiled, or “cut up,” acquires an entirely different meaning.
Russian information structures systematically monitor Ukraine’s information space, look for vulnerabilities, and promptly use them for their own purposes. If a representative of the defense industry makes an ambiguous statement or makes a communication error, Russian propaganda can instantly seize on these words, take them out of context, and build the narrative it needs around them
The information is then disseminated through social networks, anonymous Telegram channels, bloggers, and other public commentators. In the process of repeated retelling and reposting, the original context is lost, while emotional assessments and accusations acquire ever greater weight. As a result, a manipulative message may return to Ukraine’s information space as if it were an independent public debate.
Some people spread it (the Russian narrative—Ed.) deliberately, while others do so without realizing that they are effectively helping the enemy. As a result, the information campaign begins to live a life of its own, while the root cause and the real context of the event recede into the background
The expert points out that the participation of politicians and other public figures with significant audiences can give such information campaigns additional influence.
Some members of parliament run their own Telegram channels, have substantial audiences, and publicly compete with the media and bloggers for reach. For them, the number of views and reactions becomes an important indicator of influence. The problem arises when the desire to attract attention begins to outweigh the need to verify information and assess the possible consequences of disseminating it
In the expert’s view, politicians’ participation in such discussions is not always conscious work on behalf of the enemy. The dissemination of manipulative or questionable facts may result from political competition, a desire to attract attention, or insufficient information hygiene.
However, regardless of the motives, the result plays into the hands of Russian propaganda: fake news and manipulations gain additional reach, while the defense enterprise ultimately has to spend resources protecting its reputation.
What information attacks threaten Ukrainian arms manufacturers with
Ukraine’s defense industry needs significant investment to expand production and create new technologies. Therefore, one of the most dangerous consequences of Russia’s information and psychological operations is the deterioration of relations between Ukrainian defense companies and international partners. After all, international cooperation involves checking counterparties, assessing reputational risks, and confidence in a manufacturer’s ability to fulfill its contractual obligations.
That is why a prolonged negative information environment surrounding an enterprise can create additional difficulties during negotiations with foreign partners.
First and foremost, Russia is seeking to influence the level of international trust in Ukraine’s defense-industrial sector. We see that today there are a number of international and European programs related to the procurement of Ukrainian weapons for the Ukrainian military, including with funding from Western partners. Accordingly, information pressure and scandals can influence public opinion in partner countries and, through it, decisions on further support for Ukraine’s defense industry
According to him, Russian information campaigns against Ukrainian arms manufacturers can lead to the cancellation of procurements, restrictions on the participation of certain companies in international programs, and more difficult access to tenders.
Moreover, reputational risks can affect not only the acquisition of new orders. Enterprises may also face difficulties in finding qualified employees and establishing cooperation with suppliers.
Andrii Shapovalov, an expert on hybrid threats and countering disinformation, emphasizes that a loss of trust in Ukrainian manufacturers may also affect the allocation of international funding.
If partners lose trust in Ukrainian manufacturers because of information campaigns, these resources may be directed toward purchasing weapons in other countries. As a result, Ukraine will lose not only potential contracts but also opportunities to develop its own industry
Where is the line between criticism of defense enterprises and manipulation?
The issue of information security in the defense industry inevitably raises another problem: how to protect strategic enterprises from discrediting campaigns while not restricting public oversight of the use of state funds. In Andrii Shapovalov’s view, the fundamental difference lies in the substantiation of accusations and responsibility for the information being disseminated.
During wartime, it is especially important to treat public statements about Ukraine’s defense industry with great care. This does not mean that the sector cannot be criticized or that real problems should be concealed. But there is a significant difference between professional criticism that helps correct shortcomings and public accusations that may weaken Ukraine’s position
In his opinion, particular caution should be exercised when communicating about the technical characteristics of weapons, production capabilities, and other sensitive aspects of manufacturers’ activities. He recalls that specialized parliamentary committees, closed sessions, and other oversight mechanisms exist specifically to examine such issues, enabling information to be verified without disclosing details that may be of interest to the enemy.
After all, the problem arises precisely when society is offered emotional accusations, unverified assumptions, or statements taken out of context instead of facts confirmed by documents.
How not to become a tool of the enemy’s PSYOP
The experts interviewed by UNN agree that countering information manipulation requires, first and foremost, a responsible attitude toward information on the part of the media, politicians, and society.
It is important to understand that such special information operations are often aimed primarily at a person’s emotional response. Their goal is to provoke outrage, distrust, or a desire to immediately share certain information. Therefore, for an objective assessment, it is important not to rush to conclusions but to give yourself some time for more information and corroboration to emerge
It is also important to consult original sources, watch full recordings of interviews, and establish the circumstances in which a particular statement was made.
People with large audiences should be especially careful, as their posts can multiply the reach of unverified reports.
Therefore, the main rule today is not to become a retransmitter of information that you have not verified. Especially if it concerns the defense industry, military capabilities, or people whose work affects the state’s defense capability