Controversial statements about nuclear weapons were made in Poland - what experts say

Poland’s Deputy Minister of National Defence Paweł Zalewski said in Brussels that Poland does not want nuclear warheads on its territory. Several hours later, the country’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, had to immediately clarify this: Poland is "consistently interested in participating in the nuclear sharing programme." Asked by Wirtualna Polska about this discrepancy, Zalewski replied that there was none, UNN reports.

Details

Paweł Zalewski is the Undersecretary of State at Poland’s Ministry of National Defence. During a visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, journalists asked him, among other things, about nuclear sharing—the programme for sharing American nuclear weapons with other Alliance countries. Poland also seeks to participate in it.

Poland ruled out deploying nuclear weapons on its territory despite the threat from russia8/27/26, 11:58 PM • 4814 views

The Polish deputy minister was asked whether a potential increase in the US military presence in Poland would also include nuclear weapons. He answered directly: no.

"I would like to say this very clearly and openly: Poland does not want nuclear warheads on its territory," Paweł Zalewski said. The reaction was swift. Poland’s Minister of National Defence, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, struck a different tone. In his account on X, he wrote that Poland is "consistently interested" in participating in NATO’s nuclear-sharing programme.

As PAP reports, Marcin Przydacz, head of the Polish president’s Bureau of International Policy, also stated that "Poland wants nuclear warheads to be stationed on its territory, and Deputy Defence Minister Paweł Zalewski’s statement to the contrary is bizarre and does not reflect state policy." In his view, the country’s prime minister and defence minister "should consider" Zalewski’s continued presence in the government.

Zalewski avoids a clear answer

Wirtualna Polska asked Paweł Zalewski about the discrepancy between his position and the words of his superior. The Polish deputy minister, the outlet reports, "avoided giving a clear answer." Instead, he cited Greece as an example—a country that formally participates in the programme but does not keep warheads on its territory.

Zalewski argued that Poland had never clearly stated its desire to participate in nuclear sharing, particularly in the form of storing warheads on its territory.

"Why do you conclude that my view differs from that of the Ministry of National Defence? There is no discrepancy between me and the Ministry of National Defence. That is the essence of my answer," Deputy Minister Zalewski replied.

However, the Greek example requires further clarification, the outlet notes. Greece did indeed store American B61 nuclear bombs at Araxos Air Base, but the weapons were withdrawn in the early 2000s, along with the withdrawal of Greek aircraft capable of carrying them. Today, Athens participates in NATO nuclear planning and can support nuclear missions with conventional capabilities—fighter escort, aerial refuelling and base air defence. This arrangement is known as SNOWCAT and is available to Allies that do not have warheads stationed at home.

The point is that Poland already participates in the programme at this level. Therefore, the Greek example answers a different question from the one Wirtualna Polska put to the deputy minister, the outlet writes.

What forms of participation in nuclear sharing are possible at all, and where did the deputy minister’s Greek example come from? Wirtualna Polska asked experts to provide answers.

What Polish experts say

Military commentator Colonel Piotr Lewandowski called the deputy minister’s words a "political dichotomy" in an interview with Wirtualna Polska. In his opinion, this is related to the absence of a National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, which the country’s president, Karol Nawrocki, has not yet adopted.

He himself remains skeptical about nuclear sharing, calling the program a "relic of the Cold War." He also believes that if Poland decided to deploy nuclear warheads on its territory, they should be Polish weapons under Polish control, the publication writes.

Nuclear sharing involves the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of a participating state. However, the Americans retain full authority to use them—the host country has no say in the matter. This is precisely what Colonel Lewandowski emphasizes.

"In my opinion, it would be far more important for Europe and Poland to produce ballistic missile systems capable of striking Russian territory. With a range of at least 3,000 kilometers. Europe currently lacks such capabilities. The Germans and the French have begun developing ballistic missiles, and this is what we should focus on," the officer said.

He stressed that this is precisely the essence of deterring Russia, rather than deploying warheads on Polish territory over which Poland has no control. In his view, Washington’s agreement to such a step would, on the one hand, confirm its readiness to defend Europe, while on the other, bring it closer to war. The colonel effectively considers the actual use of nuclear weapons "extremely unlikely," the publication writes.

Wirtualna Polska asked former head of the National Security Bureau, General Stanisław Koziej, whether participation in nuclear sharing entails storing nuclear warheads in Poland. It turns out that this is not a necessary condition, but the general does not consider this an argument for lesser participation. On the contrary, in his view, Poland should seek every possible way to take part in the program.

There are several forms of participation, ranging from adapting aircraft to carry nuclear weapons to storing warheads. Poland could also prepare airports to accommodate aircraft transporting such weapons, provide air cover, or refuel them in the air, the publication writes.

"I maintain that Poland should participate in this program to the greatest extent possible, as it is most vulnerable to the negative consequences of Russia’s de-escalation doctrine involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons," Koziej told the publication .

Therefore, in his view, Warsaw should convince its allies of the need to expand nuclear sharing and not send the signal that it wants the program, but only "a little."

"Strategic communication with allies cannot contain hesitation or indecision. This is also a bad signal to Russia. That is why I was very surprised by this statement. I hope it is merely a communication error, rather than a substantive one," concluded the former head of Poland’s National Security Bureau (BBN).

"The fact is that the positions of Zalewski and Kosiniak-Kamysz are not mutually exclusive. The deputy minister was speaking about warheads, while the deputy prime minister was speaking about the program—and, as experts explain, the program is not the same thing as a nuclear weapons arsenal. They could both have said the same thing: Poland wants to participate in nuclear sharing; we are discussing this option with our allies. Instead, they spent the day explaining to each other what Poland wants," the publication notes.