Systematic strikes by the Defense Forces of Ukraine against the energy, fuel, transport, and military infrastructure of occupied Crimea throughout the spring and summer have significantly complicated Russia’s use of the peninsula as a military hub. Operation "Crimean Switch off" did not lead to the immediate collapse of the Russian grouping or the energy system of occupied Crimea, but it has had a cumulative effect: problems with logistics and fuel supplies, power outages, and reduced air defense capabilities. A collateral but tangible consequence was the effective disruption of the holiday season, on which a significant share of local small businesses depends. UNN discussed the consequences of the systematic Ukrainian strikes on facilities in the occupied peninsula with experts.
"Crimean Switch off": what kind of operation is it?
"Crimean Switch off" is the name of a campaign by the Unmanned Systems Forces aimed primarily at energy infrastructure in the occupied territories. It is being conducted in parallel with Operation "MoLoChKa," whose targets include tankers and other vessels providing Russian logistics in the Black and Azov Seas.
"Crimean Switch off" began on July 1, while "MoLoChKa" began on July 6. Both special operations fit into Kyiv’s strategy of coercing Russia into peace.
One of the first targets of Ukraine’s middle strikes was the "TES-Terminal-1" terminal in Kerch. It is a large facility for storing light petroleum products. Substations with voltages of 110–220 kV in Yalta, Kerch, Sudak, Feodosia, Alushta, and other populated areas were systematically targeted.
According to the Unmanned Systems Forces, by August 28, 315 energy facilities had been hit since the start of the operation. The targets included the Balaklava Thermal Power Plant in Sevastopol and gas-turbine stations in Karierne and Naumivka.
In parallel, Ukraine carried out strikes against maritime logistics. As of August 22, according to the commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, 242 vessels in the Black and Azov Seas had been hit. It was separately reported that four of the five key ferries of the Kerch crossing had been disabled.
The Unmanned Systems Forces carried out the main strikes on tankers using attack UAVs manufactured by FirePoint
In addition, at the beginning of the summer, Ukrainian troops destroyed the main bridges connecting the peninsula with mainland Ukraine, which significantly complicated logistics for Russian occupation forces.
How strikes on Crimea affect the front
For Russia, Crimea remains primarily a major military and logistical hub through which, among other things, the occupying forces in southern Ukraine are supplied. That is why strikes by the Ukrainian military are not limited to the energy sector.
According to military expert Ivan Stupak, this summer Ukraine has been systematically targeting air defense, electronic warfare systems, warehouses, bases, fuel infrastructure, and Russian logistics.
This is important because Crimea is not simply territory for Russia, but a major military hub. And Ukraine is precisely trying to gradually undermine its capabilities. This concerns strikes on warehouses, bases, logistics, fuel infrastructure, and other military infrastructure. The goal here is absolutely clear—to reduce Russia’s ability to supply its grouping in southern Ukraine. In particular, this concerns Zaporizhzhia Oblast—the areas of Huliaipole, Orikhiv, and Stepnohirsk. We are trying to create conditions for Russia under which it will be more difficult for it to support its offensive operations
According to him, the fight against Russian road logistics has become a separate area.
And I would say that we have already significantly undermined their capabilities in Crimea. Over the past three months, according to the data I have seen and that can be verified, Ukraine has destroyed about 600 trucks every month. These are very large figures. In fact, this represents a serious reduction in the volumes that Russia can transport and supply
However, this does not yet mean the destruction of the entire Russian supply system on the southern front. Military expert Mykhailo Zhyrokhov draws attention to the key role of the Crimean Bridge and railway connections.
As long as such an important strategic structure as the Crimean Bridge exists, Russia has the ability to maintain more or less normal supplies for the troops stationed on the occupied peninsula. We understand that a single train can deliver more fuel than dozens of fuel trucks, which can then be destroyed on the road from Novorossiysk. Rail supply is the foundation
At the same time, experts identify the gradual weakening of Russian air defenses on the occupied peninsula as one of the most noticeable results of the Ukrainian campaign.
“Madyar” showed strikes by Ukrainian UAVs of the Fire Point company against Russian air defense systems
If we are talking specifically about military capabilities, I would say that Russia’s air defense capabilities have been severely undermined. Almost every day, reports emerged that either a radar station, an anti-aircraft missile system, or even some aircraft at an airfield had been destroyed. This is gradually reducing the Russians’ ability to shoot down our drones
But in his view, this is not yet a strategic turning point in this area.
Stupak also does not expect an immediate effect from the Crimean operations. In his assessment, this is rather a cumulative effect and a gradual reduction in the capabilities of Russia’s military machine in Crimea.
If this trend continues in the autumn and winter, I would not speak of some immediate collapse of Crimea. I am more inclined toward a different scenario - Russia may gradually reduce its presence on the peninsula
In his view, the Russians could potentially move some administrative and military structures to the mainland, change their basing locations, and reduce their use of airfields in Crimea.
Such a reduction in presence is quite likely. I think that Ukraine could potentially further reduce Crimea’s importance by 20–30%. And this, accordingly, could reduce the Russians’ ability to use the peninsula to launch attacks on Ukraine’s southern regions
Strikes on energy infrastructure: disruptions are already occurring, but the system is holding for now
Energy infrastructure became a separate area of the operation. Systematic attacks on substations, generation facilities, fuel terminals, and oil depots have caused disruptions both to civilian infrastructure and to the occupying forces. According to Zhirokhov, prolonged power outages in Crimea were reported in Russia.
Then a campaign of strikes on Crimea’s energy infrastructure began. What did this lead to? To certain shifts. Reports appeared on Russian public channels that individual districts had been left without electricity for one, two, or three days at a time
According to Zhirokhov, the key factor enabling Russia to compensate for some of its losses remains the energy bridge between Crimea and Krasnodar Krai.
Along with the construction of the Crimean Bridge, the Russians built what is known as an energy bridge, through which they transmit electricity from Krasnodar Krai. Therefore, without destroying this energy bridge, all these strikes are, you know, for now merely figures in the General Staff’s reports: so many electrical substations hit, some other facilities hit. This certainly creates problems, but it does not break the system
At the same time, fuel problems arising from strikes on tankers and oil depots could directly affect Russian units at the front. According to Stupak, internal Russian reports recorded a reduction in fuel supplies.
One separate and important issue is fuel and energy infrastructure. Strikes on oil depots, fuel terminals, and other facilities create problems for the Russians. I saw their internal reports and their response to Ukrainian strikes. At certain points, they acknowledged a reduction in fuel supplies to the front by approximately 20–25%
In modern warfare, fuel is needed not only for armored vehicles and automobiles, but also to operate generators, on which, among other things, the ability to charge FPV drone batteries, maintain communications, and so on depends.
And at certain moments, the Russians complained that they were short of fuel for their generators by approximately 20%. This means they have to conserve their batteries and launch fewer reconnaissance and strike drones. But I cannot say that this is already a widespread problem along the entire front line. Nevertheless, the local problems are noticeable
The situation in Crimea may become even more complicated in winter. Economist and former spokesperson for NJSC "Naftogaz of Ukraine" in the Lviv region Viktor Halchynskyi predicts problems with supplying the peninsula with gas as well.
If the gas issue is further addressed, it will be cold in Crimea. As far as I know, the storage facilities located there have also been damaged. If the Defense Forces take certain further actions, combined with the shortage of liquid fuel and electricity, this could lead to an extremely uncomfortable winter on the peninsula, even taking into account the fact that the climate there is warmer
Resort season under attack: Crimea has lost tourists and money
The disruption of the resort season was the most tangible consequence for the civilian population of occupied Crimea. Problems with fuel and electricity, constant strikes, disruptions to transport logistics, and the overall danger made vacationing in occupied Crimea almost impossible. At the end of June, Russians who had come to vacation on the occupied peninsula fled en masse. Even 15-kilometre queues to leave Crimea were recorded.
According to Halchynskyi's estimate, the 2026 resort season became the worst for the occupied peninsula since 2014.
It is difficult to assess the damage in absolute figures because we can see the situation in the temporarily occupied territory exclusively through media estimates and reports that leak onto the internet from individual users. But we can say with confidence that the damage from the 2026 resort season, which in fact did not take place, is probably the greatest since the occupation, that is, since 2014
In his opinion, the actual disruption of the resort season became the culmination of a process that began immediately after the occupation of Crimea, when Ukrainian and European tourists stopped visiting the peninsula.
Due to the lack of fuel and electricity, constant air attacks, and the blocking of transport connections, the season had effectively ended prematurely in June. Accordingly, the tourism sector failed to receive substantial funds
According to experts, the consequences are being felt primarily by local small businesses, whose earnings had been tied to the summer for decades. Mykhailo Zhyrokhov notes that the model was simple: the money earned in summer enabled many Crimeans to live through the rest of the year.
But psychologically and socially, this is undoubtedly a major blow for the residents of Crimea. Most small businesses in Crimea—both under Ukraine and under Russia—were built specifically around the resort season. People earned money in summer and then effectively lived on it in autumn and winter. Now this model has been disrupted. Certain economic problems have arisen, and people have failed to earn the expected amount of money
Halchynskyi also speaks of the gradual winding down of businesses and the possible outflow of the economically active population from the peninsula.
If we are talking about business in Crimea, it is obvious that a very large number of people earned their living specifically from tourism. Now businesses are closing. There are problems with energy and problems with security. And, judging indirectly from what we see, this process has gradually begun
According to him, there is no mass evacuation at present, but people may move their economic activity outside Crimea or leave the peninsula altogether.
At the same time, experts remind us that Crimea has always received subsidies from the state budget. For the occupation administration, a decline in tourist flows also means reduced revenues and greater dependence on Russia's federal budget.
Most likely, the Crimean authorities will once again have to appeal to Russia's federal budget and request more direct transfers for 2027. Crimea is already the most heavily subsidized region, and the reduction in tourist flows only increases this dependence
This, in his view, is one of the additional effects of the Ukrainian campaign of strikes on Crimea. After all, any additional Russian budget expenditures on Crimea reduce the possibilities for military spending.
It is beneficial for us if money from the Russian budget is spent not on military purposes. If Russia is forced to direct more funds toward supporting Crimea, compensating for losses in the tourism sector, restoring infrastructure, and making direct transfers, this already works to our advantage. Because Russia never has an excess of money. And the more the Russian budget is forced to spend on problems arising from Ukrainian strikes, the fewer resources potentially remain for the war
At the same time, Zhirokhov believes that losses suffered by small businesses due to the disrupted resort season will not be a problem for the Russian authorities, since the Kremlin will not consider the interests of Crimeans a priority.
Thus, the main effect of Ukrainian operations in Crimea lies in the gradual increase in the cost of occupying Crimea for Russia. Moscow is forced to simultaneously compensate for losses to military logistics, restore energy facilities, strengthen air defenses, support the subsidized economy of the peninsula, and respond to Crimea's growing unattractiveness to tourists.
And if the systematic nature of such strikes is maintained, occupied Crimea will become increasingly difficult to use simultaneously as a military bridgehead, a logistics center, and a symbolic "showcase" for Russians.