Ukrainian long-range drones continue to systematically attack key enterprises in russia’s oil-refining industry (refineries). At the same time, this is no longer just a matter of individual attacks, as some enterprises are being hit repeatedly, and the aggressor country is forced to repair damaged facilities while simultaneously trying to compensate for their output through other plants. UNN, together with experts, examined how far Ukraine is capable of extending its long-range sanctions.
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In August alone, 18 strikes on Russian oil refineries were recorded. In particular, on August 28, Ukrainian forces using long-range FP-1 UAVs attacked the Yaroslavl refinery, which is among russia’s five largest plants by volume of primary oil refining. In addition, the Perm refinery ("Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez") was hit last week; it lost about 86% of its refining capacity and is currently shut down. Long-range FP-1 drones also attacked "Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez" in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod region, which ranks fourth by refining volume. The plant’s operations were also halted.
Over the years of the full-scale war, Ukraine’s long-range capabilities have changed significantly. Military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko recalled that in 2022, the distances involved were considerably shorter.
"We started with strikes at the tactical level—within approximately 50 kilometers of the Ukrainian border… Over the following years, the capabilities of our long-range drones changed substantially. Today, we can speak of systems capable of covering nearly 3,000 kilometers or even more. At the same time, not only the technical equipment but also the use of these systems has been scaled up. Systematic strikes take place almost every night, preventing russia from fully restoring the operations of the enterprises and production facilities being targeted," the expert noted.
In fact, the main change is that a long-range strike has ceased to be a one-off demonstration of capabilities and has become a systematic tool. This is especially evident in the case of refineries.
"When it comes to refineries, this is no longer a story about one strike followed by waiting for the plant to recover. We act step by step—one strike, then the next, and then another. As a result, the main production facilities are gradually put out of operation, while russia does not have enough time to restore their full functionality. In other words, Ukraine has already reached a level at which it can systematically keep Russian enterprises operating at partial or limited capacity. And this capability can be scaled up to other areas. This is where I see the main change compared with the beginning of the full-scale war," Oleksandr Kovalenko emphasized.
The Ukrainian military also notes that just two years ago, there were no such capabilities to strike at this range. However, these capabilities are now developing, and the strikes are having a strategically significant and long-lasting effect in terms of their impact on the adversary.
Energy expert and professor at Poltava Polytechnic Stanislav Ihnatiev added that it is now possible to speak of a systemic factor affecting the operation of russia’s oil-refining industry as a whole.
"Broadly speaking, we can identify three stages of this campaign. At first, the strikes created local problems for individual plants. Then they began to affect regional fuel balances. Now we are seeing the third stage, when problems arise simultaneously with refining, interregional logistics, fuel reserves, exports, and equipment repairs," he emphasized.
According to him, the Russian oil-refining system is already losing its resilience reserve—each subsequent strike occurs while some of the other enterprises are already undergoing repairs or operating under an altered technological regime.
"In my view, it is precisely the repeated nature of the attacks that has the greatest long-term effect. After the first strike, the enterprise conducts an assessment of the damage, orders equipment, mobilizes repair crews, and restructures its technological process. In a few weeks or months, part of its capacity may be restored. But if the enterprise is hit again after partial restoration, the economics of repairs change fundamentally. What I would call the effect of accumulated technological losses emerges. For example, after the first attack, the primary processing unit is shut down. The plant redirects the flows to another unit. After the next attack, the secondary processing unit is damaged. Another attack may hit the power supply system, the tank farm, or the railway loading rack. Formally, the refinery continues to exist and may even produce something. But its technological efficiency gradually declines," Stanislav Ihnatiev explained.
He explained that repairing one large refinery is a routine industrial task, but repairing ten enterprises simultaneously is already a problem. The situation is further complicated by sanctions, as they make it difficult to replace foreign equipment.
"The third factor is the need to maintain a reserve. Under normal conditions, reserve capacity makes it possible to get through the scheduled maintenance of one plant. But if the reserve is constantly used to compensate for emergency shutdowns, it ceases to be a reserve. That is why repeated attacks are far more dangerous for the system than one extremely large-scale attack," the professor added.
Which drones provide this capability?
At the same time, scaling up strikes on facilities deep inside Russia depends not only on the flight range of an individual drone, but also on the ability to produce and deploy them in large numbers.
In response to a request from UNN, the General Staff named the types of attack UAVs most frequently used by defense force units to carry out missions: FP-1, An-196, RS-1 "Bars", Sichen, RZ-100 "Morok", and Mіch-2000.
"Since the beginning of 2026, the FP-1 UAV has accounted for the largest share of successfully completed combat missions due to its relatively high effectiveness and the scale of its deployment. The number of FP-1 UAVs deployed is twice the total number of other principal attack UAVs deployed. In other words, in terms of the numerical ranking of successfully completed combat missions, the FP-1 UAV confidently holds first place," the General Staff stated.
The FP-1 is manufactured by the Ukrainian company Fire Point. The FP-1 has proven effective as a UAV for strikes on facilities deep in Russia's rear. As the company stated, its latest modification is capable of covering a distance of 3,400 km.
Can Ukrainian drones reach the remaining refineries?
The aggressor country's air defense and electronic warfare capabilities remain serious challenges, since Ukrainian long-range drones are not a system that cannot be intercepted.
"When it comes to range, this is primarily a technical issue. For a drone to fly farther, it needs a sufficient fuel reserve, an economical engine, and a fuel system that consumes as little of that fuel as possible. If these characteristics are improved, the range can be increased… At the same time, increasing range is only one element. Route planning, reconnaissance, and the number of drones will remain no less important. The more aircraft we can use simultaneously, the more difficult it is for the enemy to intercept them and the higher the probability of achieving the necessary result," Oleksandr Kovalenko noted.
In his opinion, Ukrainian drones will eventually be able to cover even greater distances than they do now.
"I will not be surprised if, by the end of 2026, we are talking about Ukrainian drones that have traveled about 4,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border and struck some oil refinery deep in Russia's rear. I also do not consider the possibility of eventually reaching Vladivostok to be something fantastic. This is an entirely realistic prospect in terms of the development of such systems' capabilities. Especially if Siberia is taken into account. In fact, from the perspective of Russian air defense, it is a large blank spot. Air defense density is significantly lower there, and there is no way to provide equally dense coverage of such a vast territory. Therefore, covering such a distance may not be as difficult as it seems if the drone successfully passes through the main areas where Russian air defense assets are concentrated," the expert emphasized.
Oleksandr Kovalenko also added that countering Ukrainian attacks is very costly for Russia. For example, missiles for Russian antiaircraft systems cost significantly more than Ukrainian long-range drones. Therefore, even from an economic standpoint, intercepting a large number of such aircraft is a very expensive process for the aggressor state.
This is precisely where the long-range campaign enters the realm of a "war of attrition."
"It is incorrect to assess the effectiveness of Ukrainian long-range strikes solely by the number of direct hits. The full range of consequences must be taken into account: Russia's costs of intercepting drones, the need to repair damaged enterprises, losses from production downtime, disruptions to logistics, and additional budget expenditures," the expert emphasized.
Thus, fewer and fewer Russian oil refineries remain unreachable targets for Ukraine today. And the systematic nature of the strikes means that Russia's problem is no longer limited to individual attacks themselves, but already lies in the constantly diminishing ability to restore the oil-refining industry.
"Crimean Switch Off"
It is worth noting that Ukraine's long-range campaign is not limited solely to Russian oil refineries. It is unfolding in parallel in Ukraine's temporarily occupied territories. On August 28, Robert Brovdi, commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, reported that between August 26 and 28 alone, the "Birds of the USF" struck 21 power nodes and the Luhansk Thermal Power Plant in Shchastia.
The reported affected facilities include substations with capacities of 220, 150, and 110 kV in the occupied territories of the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Kherson regions and Crimea, as well as a number of gas distribution stations.
According to Brovdi, since the beginning of the USF's "Crimean Switch Off" operation, 315 power nodes in Crimea and other temporarily occupied territories have already been struck. We will provide more details in our next publication about how Crimea experienced this year's summer season.