The winter of 2026–2027 in Kyiv Oblast will definitely not be more difficult than the previous one, as work to protect critical infrastructure is in full swing; however, the problem of financing remains. This was reported by Deputy Minister for Recovery, Infrastructure and Transport Ruslan Oliinyk in an interview with Telegraf, UNN writes.
Will all of Kyiv Oblast’s energy facilities be protected before the frosts arrive? Should the region expect prolonged power outages? What plans do the authorities have in case the enemy destroys bridges in the capital? Read the answers to these and other questions in the article.
"The biggest challenge is security"
— Mr. Ruslan, you headed the working group preparing the protection of energy facilities in Kyiv Oblast. Is the situation in this area in Kyiv Oblast so bad that the ministry had to intervene?
The situation is difficult but under control and requires constant attention, as Kyiv Oblast is a strategically important region. The ministry, together with the Kyiv Regional Military Administration, is strengthening coordination and working to resolve current issues related to the protection of energy infrastructure.
When Mykola Kalashnyk and I worked at the Regional Military Administration, one of the areas I was responsible for was protecting the region—from planning measures to organizing and monitoring their implementation. This is comprehensive work covering various areas, including energy and life-support facilities.
In particular, state funding provides for the construction of a second level of protection for 110 kV substations. It is also essential to ensure the first level of protection for 35 kV substations (a 110 kV substation is a regional-level electricity transmission hub, while 35 kV is an intermediate link that distributes electricity closer to end consumers, — ed.), cogeneration units, sewage and water-supply pumping stations, water-treatment facilities, boiler houses, and gas transmission and gas distribution system facilities.
— When you read comments under news reports about protecting energy infrastructure, many people ask: did this work really begin only now? What were officials doing in the spring and summer?
We had been working in this area before. During the period when Mykola Kalashnyk headed the Kyiv Regional Military Administration (from March 24, 2025, to July 16, 2026, — ed.), and I worked as first deputy head, we were engaged in planning and implementing measures to protect critical infrastructure. Now, given the scale of the tasks and the tight deadlines, coordination among all involved parties, the prompt resolution of problematic issues, and monitoring compliance with schedules have become particularly important.
After more effective cooperation with the regional military administration was established, construction rates tripled. For us, it is fundamentally important not only to plan the work but also to ensure that it is completed within the specified deadlines.
— What is the current situation with the construction of first- and second-level protection for energy infrastructure? Can we give completion percentages?
Work to protect first- and second-level facilities is ongoing, and its implementation is under constant monitoring. At the same time, I cannot disclose detailed information about the degree of readiness of individual facilities for security reasons.
Our task is to ensure that the planned measures are carried out within the specified deadlines, respond promptly to problematic issues, and coordinate the work of all involved parties.
— What problems do contractors face while carrying out the assigned tasks?
The biggest challenge is the security situation. We are talking about critical infrastructure facilities, which remain among the priority targets of Russian attacks. Therefore, contractors have to organize construction work under the constant threat of shelling, while air-raid alarms directly affect the pace at which tasks are completed.
Response protocols for air threats are in effect at construction sites. Contractors continuously monitor the security situation, information about the movement of enemy targets, and risks to specific facilities. Depending on the level of danger, decisions are made to suspend work and evacuate personnel to shelters.
In particular, when the threat level is at its highest, work is suspended and employees move to safe locations. At a lower risk level, those responsible continue to monitor the situation and act in accordance with established safety protocols. The top priority is the lives and health of the people working at these facilities.
At the same time, the construction of protective structures is a complex technological process involving a large number of people, heavy machinery and specialized equipment. Each forced stoppage means more than just lost working time. Once the threat has passed, personnel must return, machinery operations must be restored and technological processes must resume. If air raid alerts occur several times during the day, this significantly affects the actual working time and the overall pace of construction.
It is particularly difficult to work at facilities that have already been hit by enemy strikes, as the risk of repeated attacks remains. Despite this, contractors continue to carry out their tasks, adjust schedules, respond promptly to changes in the security situation and use the available opportunities to conduct the work.
— Will we manage to protect the key facilities before winter?
As for the 110 kV substations, a second level of protection is предусмотрed. One of its key elements is a concrete shelter, known as a shelter, which is intended to reduce the risk of damage to equipment as a result of attacks by enemy aerial targets.
Provided that funding remains stable, materials are supplied properly and no critical obstacles arise, contractors will be able to install protection for the key facilities within the planned time frames, in particular before winter.
The next step will be the construction of a pre-detonation screen, whose task is to intercept an enemy aerial target before it hits the shelter. This will make it possible to minimize the consequences of the attack.
What about the money
— What is the situation with funding for the work? The figure of UAH 1.6 billion is being cited, of which UAH 1.1 billion was allocated by the state and UAH 500 million by the regional budget. Are these figures correct?
This concerns two areas of funding. Approximately UAH 1.1 billion was allocated from the state budget for the construction of the second level of protection for 110 kV substations. Of this amount, approximately UAH 700 million has already been transferred to contractors as advance payments.
The regional budget funds are to be directed toward implementing the first level of protection for the region’s energy and life-support facilities. This is basic physical protection using filled big bags. They help protect equipment from fragments and indirect damage during attacks.
It is important to understand that these funds are intended for different areas of protection.
— But are these amounts adequate after all? Will they be enough to build the planned protection?
When the protection projects for the 110 kV substations were initially developed, the security situation in the region was different. Subsequently, after updated recommendations from the General Staff were taken into account and the design solutions were adjusted, the cost of implementing the second level of protection increased, in particular due to the larger volumes of metal structures for the protective facilities.
Therefore, the adequacy of the funding must be assessed taking into account the updated cost of the projects and the specific tasks that need to be completed.
— How much has the cost increased?
At the beginning of the year, the preliminary expected cost of implementing protection projects for all priority 110 kV substations was approximately UAH 1.7–1.8 billion. After the General Staff’s recommendations were taken into account and the projects were adjusted, the total cost increased to UAH 2.3 billion.
In other words, the initial estimate increased by approximately UAH 500–600 million.
At present, UAH 1.1 billion in state funding has been allocated for this area. Of this amount, approximately UAH 700 million has already been transferred to contractors as advance payments. This is almost 64% of the state funding allocated. At the same time, the advance payments amount to approximately 31% of the total updated cost of the protection projects for all priority substations, which is estimated at UAH 2.3 billion.
Construction sites have been supplied with metal for the installation of shelters and pre-detonation screens. According to preliminary estimates, the cost of the materials and work already completed is approximately UAH 1.2 billion.
Contractors continue to carry out the work, and ensuring adequate financial support remains important for keeping to the schedules.
To accelerate the work and ensure the timely completion of tasks, Head of the Kyiv Regional Military Administration Tymur Tkachenko is working on increasing advance payments to contractors.
— You say that the estimated cost of protecting substations has risen to UAH 2.3 billion. Where can the funds that are lacking be obtained?
This is an issue that needs to be resolved at the state level. The Ministry will explore opportunities for additional funding and appeal to the Government to allocate the necessary funds. This concerns not only the Kyiv region but also other regions of Ukraine.
After taking into account the recommendations of the General Staff and adjusting the projects, the average cost of protecting one 110 kV substation in the Kyiv region is approximately UAH 90 million. In some regions of the country, this amount reaches UAH 120 million.
Our goal is to ensure the necessary level of protection and find solutions that will make it possible to complete the planned work.
"We took the experience of the previous winter into account"
— Is there a program to protect power transmission lines specifically from drones? We know that the enemy has begun using drones with specialized shaped-charge cutting payloads to destroy power lines.
Countering enemy aerial targets in this case is solely the task of the defense forces. Our task is to cooperate with them and provide the necessary support within our authority.
On certain issues, I work closely with the defense forces. In particular, together with Mykola Kalashnyk, we worked on implementing the "Clear Sky" project in the Kyiv region, which demonstrated high effectiveness in destroying enemy aerial targets.
— So, in the case of power lines, are we talking only about military protection, rather than some kind of shelters?
Of course. This is purely a military task. Our role is to assist them and provide the necessary support.
— You predict that the protection of critical facilities and life-support facilities will be implemented by winter. To what extent will this increase the resilience of the Kyiv region’s energy system and reduce the risk of prolonged power outages? After all, even this kind of protection does not guarantee that the facilities will withstand missile strikes.
Much depends on the scale of enemy attacks and the number of available means of destruction. No engineering protection can guarantee absolute safety, so it is important to prepare comprehensively.
The Resilience Plan provides not only for the protection of critical facilities but also for other measures—in particular, the development of distributed generation and the provision of backup power. This should help reduce the consequences of possible damage and increase the region’s resilience to prolonged power outages.
— So, there will be no prolonged outages?
The comprehensive Resilience Plan was developed precisely to minimize risks and prevent the worst-case scenarios for the Kyiv region. In preparing it, we took into account the experience of the previous heating season and, together with DTEK and other specialized services, identified the necessary measures.
At the same time, it is impossible to responsibly predict the complete absence of prolonged outages, as much depends on the nature and scale of enemy attacks. Our task is to do everything necessary to ensure that the region is as prepared as possible for potential challenges.
— So, to sum up, will residents of the Kyiv region have an easier time this winter than last winter?
I expect that, thanks to the implementation of the planned measures, the region will be able to get through the winter period more steadily. We took the experience of the previous winter into account, identified the main risks, and provided for measures that should help reduce the consequences of possible attacks and disruptions to infrastructure operations.
— Is the information I heard during a closed meeting with journalists from the Kyiv City State Administration true—that the enemy destroyed all the oil depots in the Kyiv region? And if so, has a fuel reserve been established for the region?
The information about the destruction of all the oil depots is not true.
The term "mobile reserve" is widely used in the fuel sector. For security reasons, I cannot disclose the details, but I will say this: both businesses are interested in uninterrupted operations, and the state has taken appropriate measures to create the necessary reserves. There is currently no reason for concern about fuel supplies in the Kyiv region.
— And what about gas? We know that a significant part of the region is heated with gas, which means that this infrastructure is an obvious target for the enemy.
During the period when Mykola Kalashnyk and I were responsible for issues concerning the vital services of the Kyiv region, we carried out extensive planning and design work together with gas services and operators, and then ensured its implementation. At that time, comprehensive measures were taken to protect gas pipelines and key infrastructure. For security reasons, I cannot provide details, but we devoted the utmost attention to this issue. And this work continues today.
On protecting the capital's bridges
— I suggest we now talk about Kyiv itself. The capital is currently facing a great deal of criticism regarding preparations for winter. In your opinion, is this criticism justified?
Let us put it this way: we are working together now, and I hope Kyiv will manage to get through this difficult period without critical consequences.
The Ministry coordinates the relevant processes within its authority. At the same time, I am constantly in contact with representatives of the capital's authorities, and we resolve many organizational issues promptly and jointly.
One recent example of such cooperation is the protection of bridges. Automated turrets have been installed on the bridges by the military. Their operation requires stable power supplies and internet access. Since the bridges are on the city's balance sheet, it would have been impossible to implement this task without cooperation with the city authorities.
— By the way, regarding the protection of the capital's bridges. There has been a great deal of criticism of the installation of anti-drone nets on the Southern and Northern bridges. People say, what is the point of them if they will not stop a heavy jet-powered drone? In addition, this creates an extra load on the bridge's metal structures.
In my opinion, such decisions should be based on a clear understanding of their purpose and effectiveness in urban conditions. Perhaps it concerned an experimental project intended to assess the relevant technical solutions. At the same time, I would not like to comment further on this issue.
— After the attacks on the capital's bridges, the Ministry spoke about plans to build alternative crossings—pontoons and embankment dams. Is this work already under way?
There is a clear task from the top leadership of the state, and it is being carried out. All the necessary forces and resources have been involved.
— I understand that the number of such crossings is sensitive information, but could you name at least approximate deadlines for completing the work? What is the timeframe: three months, by the end of the year, six months?
Our task is to ensure alternative routes, including access roads and crossings, in the shortest possible time. At the same time, the deadlines also depend on the security situation, which directly affects the pace of the work.
It must be taken into account that these works are being carried out by people amid wartime risks. Therefore, the safety of the workers remains an unconditional priority.
— But this will not cover 100% of the existing traffic across the bridges, will it?
It should not be expected that alternative routes will fully replace the existing capacity of the capital's bridges. Their task is to create additional opportunities for movement and increase the resilience of the transport system if the main routes are damaged.
The construction of additional bridges is planned, with the prospect of their further expansion and increased capacity. The solutions developed provide for the phased development of alternative infrastructure.
On an offensive against Kyiv
— What about sewage and water supply? We have already seen problems with sewage after enemy attacks. Kyiv is being criticized for the lack of backup power for water utilities. Are there risks that the capital and the Kyiv region will be left without water and wastewater services in winter?
I would not make such categorical predictions. Regarding certain issues concerning the city of Kyiv, the Ministry's work is coordinated by Deputy Minister responsible for this area, Kyrylo Fesyk.
A great deal has already been done overall, and work is continuing to ensure that Kyiv and the Kyiv region get through the winter period steadily.
— This year, we have already witnessed the capital’s metro being shut down due to a power outage. Some experts predict that the metro could stop operating for days or even weeks. Are these real risks?
I have not yet encountered any tasks that our energy workers could not handle. They have experience working in difficult conditions, including during large-scale attacks on energy infrastructure. The past heating season demonstrated how important their professionalism, coordination, and readiness to respond promptly to challenges are.
At the same time, assessing the risks to metro operations depends on many factors, including the nature of possible damage and the availability of backup power.
— You were the military commandant of the Kyiv region and the first deputy head of the operational headquarters of the Kyiv Regional Defense Council. From time to time, warnings are voiced that the enemy may repeat its offensive in the Kyiv region, which failed in 2022. Is the region prepared?
I would not want such a course of events, as it would be another serious challenge for the residents of Kyiv and the region. At the same time, the region’s defense remains one of the key priorities.
The capital and the region have sufficient forces and means to defend themselves and deter the enemy. I know well the general who commands the army corps responsible for the defense of the Kyiv region. I am confident that the military command is doing everything necessary to fulfill the assigned tasks and prevent the enemy from advancing.