Budget millions for Odrex, or why the NHCU pays a clinic that patients complain about
Kyiv • UNN
In 2025, the Odrex clinic received over UAH 37.5 million from the Ukrainian budget under the Medical Guarantees Program, despite criminal proceedings and numerous patient complaints. This became possible because the NHCU is guided by partner selection criteria that do not take into account the reputation of medical institutions, which may pose risks to patients.
While law enforcement agencies investigate numerous criminal cases involving the private clinic Odrex, under articles on medical negligence and fraud, the National Health Service of Ukraine (NSZU) transfers millions of budget funds to the medical institution within the framework of the Medical Guarantees Program. How much the cooperation with the scandalous clinic costs the state, read in the material by UNN.
In 2025, the total amount of cooperation under the Medical Guarantees Program between the National Health Service of Ukraine and the private Odesa clinic "Odrex" amounted to over UAH 37.5 million. The information that UNN received from the NSZU in response to a journalistic inquiry demonstrates that despite public scandals surrounding the clinic and criminal investigations in which it is involved, state funding for the medical institution remains consistently high. Converted at the market exchange rate, last year Odrex clinic received almost $1 million from the Ukrainian budget.
NSZU data indicates that the clinic received the largest amounts of funding for key packages of the Medical Guarantees Program. Specifically, UAH 15.4 million was allocated for primary medical care, UAH 11.38 million for the treatment of acute cerebral stroke, and over UAH 5.2 million for inpatient rehabilitation. At the same time, the medical institution received UAH 2.35 million for the treatment of acute myocardial infarction, over UAH 1.56 million for palliative care, and over UAH 1.52 million for outpatient rehabilitation. Thus, a significant portion of budget funds was directed to treating patients in critical conditions, where the quality of medical care is of fundamental importance for their lives and health.
Despite this, the mechanism for selecting medical institutions for cooperation with the NSZU can be described as formal and one that does not take into account the reputation of the clinics with which partnerships are concluded. In fact, such a model creates risks for the system itself, as exclusively technical selection criteria limit the ability to respond to reputational challenges and public scandals surrounding the counterparties of the Medical Guarantees Programs.
The system is organized in such a way that each payment is based on relevant data, and all medical records are subject to continuous automated verification. The NSZU constantly analyzes medical records, reconciles information with state registers, and tracks the movement of patients and medical personnel. This ensures the timely detection of anomalies, atypical patterns, and discrepancies between the volume of services provided, staffing, available equipment, and data entered into the system. The subject of such monitoring is primarily the completeness and accuracy of electronic medical records submitted for payment. In particular, the analysis records cases of discrepancies that may indicate violations: incorrect coding of interventions, discrepancies between diagnoses and treatment performed, selection of interventions for higher tariffs, or other attempts to influence the cost of the case.
In other words, the system checks how services are provided from a formal point of view, but it does not answer the question of whether it is generally worth entrusting budget funds, and most importantly, the health and lives of patients, to a particular institution.
Such criteria for selecting NSZU partners appear particularly critical given that the Odrex clinic is involved in 10 criminal proceedings. As UNN previously reported, according to the Prosecutor General's Office, the investigations concern financial aspects and improper performance of professional duties by medical personnel.
Furthermore, ignoring reputational risks becomes particularly dangerous given the growing wave of patient dissatisfaction. The public outcry surrounding the medical institution's activities has grown into an active public movement, StopOdrex. It was initiated by the families of deceased patients and people who consider themselves victims of the clinic's doctors. Currently, the website and Telegram channel of the initiative have become platforms for publishing numerous stories from people about negative experiences of treatment at the Odesa clinic.
In their accounts, participants of the StopOdrex movement write about patients being discharged in critical condition, the concealment of consequences of unsuccessful operations, and cases where treatment under the Medical Guarantees Program, according to people, resulted in tragedies and acquired disabilities. In fact, while the NSZU reports on "automated verification," real people are forced to unite to be heard in conditions where the system ignores them.
Thus, the absence of a clause on reputation and a history of criminal offenses in the NSZU's selection criteria creates a dangerous precedent. It turns out that any private structure can receive state funding if it can formally ensure the availability of equipment and correctly fill out medical records in the eHealth system. Therefore, instead of being a guarantor of quality, the system turns into a blind mechanism for distributing funds, where a bloody trail, systemic medical errors, and crippled patients can be hidden behind ideal digital reports.