The Criminal Underworld as a Source of Information: Why Intelligence Services Need Agents
Kyiv • UNN
Experts explained why the Security Service of Ukraine contacts the criminal underworld and how to distinguish intelligence work from complicity in a crime.
Recent events have once again drawn attention to the complex and often ambiguous work of intelligence services with agents, where the line between good and evil is not always obvious. The SBU’s operational activities often involve contacts with people who possess important information, including representatives of the criminal underworld or sources behind enemy lines. UNN spoke with former SBU employees to find out how agent networks operate, why intelligence services interact with representatives of various milieus, and where the line lies between operational work and participation in a criminal group.
Intelligence services look for information where it exists
The operational work of intelligence services involves searching for information where it is actually located. For example, members of the criminal world may possess data about planned crimes, the activities of organized groups, or illegal channels for moving goods. Therefore, to obtain such information, intelligence services have to work directly with people who are inside the relevant environment.
Former SBU employee Ivan Stupak explained that intelligence services cannot limit themselves to contacts only with certain categories of citizens.
"The logic of their work is that if a person possesses important information, it is necessary to establish contact with them regardless of the environment to which they belong. If someone has the necessary information, the intelligence service must use this opportunity. The main thing is that the person is knowledgeable about a specific issue and can provide up-to-date information. Moreover, for effective work, it is important that this not be a one-time conversation, but a permanent source of information," he said.
According to him, such interaction is particularly important when countering organized crime.
"Here, it is practically impossible to work effectively without contacts with representatives of the relevant environment. For example, it is necessary to understand who is planning to move a shipment of drugs, how international criminal networks operate, particularly in the Balkans, the Caucasus, or within the Albanian criminal milieu. The same applies to information about the contract-killing market, the preparation of crimes, and the activities of organized groups. People inside the criminal environment may possess information about specific orders, agreements, and plans to which law enforcement agencies do not have direct access. For example, someone may learn about a possible assassination attempt against a servicemember and pass this information on to the intelligence services," Ivan Stupak explained.
Operational work often takes place on the boundary between good and evil
At the same time, the experts interviewed note that the mere fact that an intelligence officer has contacts with a representative of the criminal environment does not mean that the officer is involved in criminal activity.
"This is the nature of operational work. If you are engaged in countering smuggling, you have to communicate with people who know how smuggling channels operate. If you are studying organized crime, you need to understand its internal structure and mechanisms of operation. Sitting in an office and not communicating with people who possess the relevant information makes it simply impossible to effectively counter such phenomena," Ivan Stupak emphasized.
Major General of the Reserve and former deputy head of the SBU Viktor Yahун also emphasizes this.
"Working with operational sources is a rather delicate area, and I would not like to disclose its specifics (…) In general, any contacts between an intelligence officer and representatives of the criminal environment must take place within established procedures and with the appropriate approval of the leadership. At the same time, operational work entails the possibility of communicating with people from entirely different environments," he said.
According to him, the specific nature of such work is that the activities of intelligence officers often take place on the boundary between good and evil.
"Is the very fact of such contacts a violation of the law? If an officer needs to have sources of information in a particular environment, how can he obtain them without contacting these people? That is precisely what operational work is for. This is activity that often takes place on the borderline between good and evil. Unfortunately, intelligence officers have to work under such conditions. And exactly where a person crosses the line and how they behave in a particular situation is an entirely different question," believes Viktor Yahun.
Experts interviewed by UNN agree that it is important to distinguish between operational contact, agent work and criminal complicity. The first may involve obtaining information from a person, while the second involves systematic interaction with a source that passes information to an intelligence service. Criminal complicity, by contrast, entails intentional participation in the commission of a crime. Therefore, for a legal assessment, it is not the mere fact of knowing or communicating with someone that matters, but the person's specific actions and intent.
In practice, the issue of distinguishing operational work from criminal complicity also arises in high-profile criminal proceedings. In particular, this applies to the case of SBU General Serhii Duka, whom NABU detectives detained on November 4 as part of the investigation into the "Carthage" case. Major General Duka is accused of participation in a criminal organization using his official position. Among the circumstances cited by the prosecution are his contacts with Andrii Osipov, who had previously been convicted multiple times and went by the nickname "Criminal," whom investigators identify as one of the organizers of the criminal organization. At the same time, according to the investigation materials, the criminal group headed by "Criminal" had contacts with employees of Russia's FSB. Countering the activities of foreign intelligence services, particularly Russian ones, falls within the competence of the SBU Department for the Protection of National Statehood, where Serhii Duka worked.
According to his lawyer, Yurii Sukhov, the case contains no specific evidence that Duka knowingly joined any criminal organization or assisted in its activities.
"NABU describes Serhii Duka's acquaintance with Andrii Osipov, nicknamed "Criminal," their telephone conversations, correspondence and contacts with law enforcement officers. All of that is fine, but it is all emotion, unacceptable in criminal proceedings. Is there specific material evidence supporting these claims? The answer can be stated unequivocally – NO. There is no specific evidence whatsoever that Serhii Duka agreed to become a member of a criminal organization, took actions or performed any criminal role. The prosecutor did not provide the court with identifying evidence linking Serhii Duka to these correspondence exchanges and conversations… Looking ahead, I will ask: is it possible that all relations with Osipov took place under the secret control of the state? And that the state wanted to derive a benefit from this in the sphere of SBU activity? But how could NABU know about such extremely complex secret matters?" Sukhov stated.