Russian military personnel are trying to bypass the blocking of Starlink terminals, in particular, by registering them to Ukrainian citizens. Military expert Oleh Zhdanov told UNN how critical Starlink terminals are for Russians at the front, why the enemy is trying to bypass the blocking precisely through Ukrainians, and what risks this creates for national security.
Earlier, the SBU published information that the enemy is trying to recruit Ukrainians to register Russian Starlink terminals.
"The Security Service of Ukraine is actively countering the Russian Federation's attempts to recruit Ukrainians for the illegal registration of Starlink systems. Currently, the Rashists have faced the blocking of Starlink terminals along the entire front line. It has been established that the occupiers are trying to restore this communication channel by any means. In particular, they offer Ukrainian citizens money to register terminals used by Russians at ASCs," the SBU emphasizes.
In addition, they added that the enemy actively posts ads with relevant registration requests on the Internet and resorts to manipulation. This includes impersonating Ukrainian military personnel who allegedly "bought Starlink with their own funds and currently cannot register it," and therefore turn "for help" to Ukrainian citizens.
Why the enemy is trying to bypass the blocking
Military expert Oleh Zhdanov explains that today Russian troops actually have only two control systems - Starlink and mobile internet using messengers. They failed to implement their own satellite program, and alternative communication means do not provide the required level of coordination.
"They have two systems that provide troop control - Starlink and mobile internet, Telegram as a messenger. The program to create their own Starlink, if I'm not mistaken, was called program 1440. It has completely failed - the money ran out, there are no satellites in orbit, there is no satellite internet. Communication means - Chinese Motorola, and that's all they can do today," the expert says.
The military expert notes that the Russians even tried to return to wired communication. According to him, the occupiers are laying cables between positions, as such communication is more difficult to suppress with electronic warfare means.
"In 2023, they tried to return to wired communication. Our soldiers say that Russian heavy drones are dragging cable reels and trying to lay kilometers of wired communication. But Starlink is very important for them. Because without it, the troop control system is disrupted," says Oleh Zhdanov.
The expert emphasizes that each Starlink terminal has a unique identification number and transmits its geolocation. SpaceX sees exactly where the device is located. Therefore, even if it is registered to a Ukrainian, it is impossible to hide the place of use.
"The satellite determines the location of the terminal with centimeter accuracy. Each Starlink has its own ID number, like a mobile phone. This number can be used to determine where it was manufactured, where it was sent, and where it is now. If the line of combat contact is known, then there are no problems with disabling it," the expert says.
At the same time, according to the expert, the Russians may try to use the "gray zone," where there is no clear front line. In such areas, it is more difficult to unequivocally determine whose position the terminal is operating from. This, in his opinion, creates risks.
"Today there is no clear front line, as in World War II. There is infiltration, there are cases when Russian positions can be behind our backs. And in the gray zone, there can be both our position and a Russian one. If someone registers a Starlink for an occupier for money, then it can work in such a zone," Oleh Zhdanov explains.
The military expert emphasizes that the main danger lies in the restoration of the Russian Federation's troop control system. Without communication, units act chaotically, while stable communication allows for interaction and increases the effectiveness of combat operations.
"If they restore the troop control system, they will restore the combat capability of the units. The main issue of organizing combat operations is interaction. And the basis of interaction is communication. When a unit is disoriented, it is easier to defeat. When there is control and coordination, it performs combat missions," the expert emphasizes.
According to Oleh Zhdanov, a complete collapse of the control system among the Russians did not happen even after the disconnections. They use alternative means of communication, including radio stations, although this is more difficult and less effective. That is why the occupiers are looking for ways to restore access to satellite internet.
"It cannot be said that everything 'turned off' for them and they are sitting deaf and dumb. They get radio stations and work through them. But this is more difficult, and these means can be suppressed by electronic warfare. Therefore, they are trying to find a way to register Starlink and restore control," the military expert emphasizes.
Oleh Zhdanov added that the Russian authorities have banned the use of Starlink on their territory, fearing data leaks. At the same time, in the occupied territories and near the front, interest in the system remains. That is why, in his opinion, attempts to recruit Ukrainians to register terminals have a practical purpose, namely, to strengthen or restore troop coordination.
Legal consequences
Lawyer Kateryna Anishchenko explained that the situation with the illegal activation of Starlink terminals in conditions of martial law can have serious legal consequences, but the issue of intent is fundamentally important.
"If a person knowingly assists in the use of such devices by the troops of the aggressor state, their actions may be qualified under:
- Art. 111-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - aiding the aggressor state. Sanction: imprisonment from 10 to 12 years with possible confiscation of property;
- Art. 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - high treason. If intentional actions to the detriment of Ukraine's defense capability are proven. Sanction: 15 years or life imprisonment with confiscation of property;
- Art. 114-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - obstructing the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Sanction: from 5 to 8 years, and for grave consequences - up to 15 years," the lawyer emphasized.
Kateryna Anishchenko also added that if a person did not know and did not have a certain intention, then criminal liability in Ukraine is based on the principle of guilt (Art. 23 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). This means that an essential feature of most of these crimes is direct or indirect intent.
"If a person did not know that their actions could be used by the enemy, did not realize the consequences, became a victim of a fraudulent scheme, or acted while being misled, then the absence of intent is a key factor for exemption from criminal liability. In such cases, it is important to immediately stop any actions after clarifying the circumstances, voluntarily inform law enforcement agencies (this can be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance), and record evidence of fraud (correspondence, payments, contacts)," the lawyer explains.
According to Kateryna Anishchenko, the court evaluates not only the fact of the action itself, but also the person's internal attitude towards it. If it is proven that the person was a victim of deception and did not intend to harm the state, criminal liability for crimes against national security does not arise. At the same time, each situation requires individual legal analysis, since the line between negligence and intent in wartime is assessed very carefully by the courts.