In September, Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s rear areas led to consequences that are increasingly extending far beyond an individual fire or a damaged facility. Russia has to simultaneously restore oil refineries and other enterprises, strengthen their protection, compensate for production losses, and find ways to preserve the operation of its defense industry, UNN writes.
Russian oil refineries became some of the priority targets. According to the monitoring channel DroneBomber✙, in September the Defense Forces struck 12 oil-processing enterprises, and at most of them oil refining was either completely halted or significantly reduced after the strikes.
At the same time, the Ukrainian military struck defense-industry enterprises, air-defense facilities, UAV production sites and storage facilities, as well as military and logistics facilities. The geography of the strikes also continued to expand: Ukrainian long-range weapons can now reach thousands of kilometers deep into Russia.
Strikes on Russia’s rear areas are becoming systematic
Military expert Oleksandr Kovalenko noted that in September the Defense Forces carried out significantly more strikes specifically against oil-industry facilities and critical production capacities of the Russian Federation.
We choose targets quite pragmatically. These are oil refineries, airfields, military facilities, defense-industry enterprises, logistics, and other important production capacities, including those in the chemical industry. In other words, this involves a comprehensive, targeted impact on everything that is important to Russia. At the same time, in September one could see a greater focus specifically on the oil-refining industry and on striking genuinely important facilities. Whereas in the summer more attention was paid, in particular, to storage facilities where drones and other products were kept, the focus has now shifted somewhat
This change became especially evident in the case of oil refineries. Strikes were increasingly carried out not simply against the territory of an enterprise, but against primary-processing units—the critical elements without which a refinery cannot operate at full capacity.
If an enterprise has several such units, damage to one of them does not necessarily stop production. But the successive destruction of several key lines can lead to the complete shutdown of the entire refinery.
This was precisely the effect observed at a number of enterprises in September. For example, on September 20, after a strike by Ukrainian FP-1 drones, the processing units at the Moscow Oil Refinery were damaged, and the plant completely halted operations. It supplied a significant share of the region’s fuel.
Map of oil refineries attacked in September. Source: DroneBomber✙
The cumulative effect of repeated strikes
After being hit, Russia tries to restore enterprises as quickly as possible. But each new strike means additional repairs, expenses, the search for equipment, and the need to strengthen air defenses around strategic facilities.
We have to strike some of the same enterprises again from time to time. But this is already affecting Russia’s ability to safely continue the production and operation of such facilities. The constant striking of one and the same enterprise creates the threat of a so-called technological collapse
According to him, a repeated strike is significant even when Russia has already managed to partially or fully restore production after the first attack.
For example, one can mention Nizhnekamskneftekhim, where an explosion occurred. The explosion itself was not necessarily a direct result of a Ukrainian strike, but it is important that the enterprise had already been affected repeatedly before this and had been forced to undergo repairs. And repairs cannot always be of high quality. This is one of the manifestations of the technological collapse that is now taking shape across Russia. After some time, even carrying out repairs may cease to ensure the full restoration of production
Strikes against Russia’s air defenses have a separate effect. The more strategic facilities fall within the potential strike zone, the larger the area of Russia that needs to be protected.
But Russia’s area and vast airspace do not work in its favor. At the same time, by my estimates, Russia loses more air defense systems almost every day than it can produce. This is a very important aspect
Strikes on the Russian Federation are also strikes on the economy
The impact of strikes on oil infrastructure is not limited to the military sphere. Refineries are part of a large chain—from oil extraction to its transportation, processing, and sale. If some enterprises shut down or reduce production, there is less fuel on the domestic market, creating additional pressure on prices.
Economic expert Oleh Ustenko said in a comment to UNN that the reduction in refinery operations also has a direct impact on the budget.
Strikes on refineries primarily create an effect inside Russia itself. And the main task, as I understand it, is to limit the revenues of the Russian state budget so that they have fewer funds to finance the war against Ukraine
At the same time, the expert cautions against the simplified conclusion that strikes on refineries automatically deprive Russia of money for the war. The aggressor country’s oil sector remains a major source of budget revenues, as Russia continues to export crude oil.
Therefore, the greatest effect occurs when strikes target not just one element of the oil system but several at the same time: ports, oil depots, storage tanks, refineries, and logistics.
First, if a refinery is struck, it stops or reduces operations and does not generate profit for a certain period. Accordingly, it pays less in taxes to the state budget. Second, if less gasoline and diesel are sold on the market, the state receives less in taxes and excise duties. In other words, budget revenues decline again and, accordingly, there are fewer opportunities to finance the war
Thus, the economic effect of the September strikes is the accumulation of additional expenses, production losses, repairs, logistical problems, and pressure on the domestic market of the Russian Federation.
Range eliminates the concept of the deep rear
At the same time, the geography of Ukrainian strikes is also changing. Ukrainian long-range weapons are already regularly reaching targets located far from the border. In September, such targets included enterprises in the Yaroslavl, Samara, Saratov, Moscow, and other regions. Among other targets, on September 9, the Defense Forces struck an объект in the area of Novy Urengoy in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, at a distance of more than 3,000 km.
We are already continuing to reach approximately 3,000 kilometers deep into the territory of the Russian Federation. This has already become a certain limit of our capabilities, which needs to be expanded. Ukraine must gradually go beyond 3,000 kilometers and gain the ability to operate at a distance of 4,000 kilometers
This is important not only because of the number of potential targets. Range forces Russia to expand the territory that needs to be defended. Facilities that could previously be considered safe because of their distance from the front now require protection against Ukrainian long-range weapons.
Weapons already in operation
According to the monitoring channel DroneBomber✙, Ukrainian forces struck 9 of the 12 refineries attacked in September using long-range FP-1 UAVs manufactured by Fire Point.
According to the company’s own data, in September the Defense Forces carried out at least 50 strikes on Russian territory using FP-1 drones.
While the Defense Forces of Ukraine continue systematically disabling enemy infrastructure—from refineries and air defense systems to ships and defense-industry facilities—we continue producing weapons to help them do so. At one time, Russia believed it had a rear area. That is in the past. Greater distances—greater results
The FP-1 is not the only system in the company’s arsenal. Fire Point also produces the medium-range FP-2 UAV and the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile. In particular, on September 11, Ukrainian forces used a "Flamingo" to strike the strategic enterprise "Volgogradpromproekt" in the Russian Federation, after which a fire broke out there.
The company is also working on two ballistic missiles. The FP-7, with a range of up to 300 km, is described by the company as a cheaper response to the American ATACMS. The second, the FP-9, is designed to cover 800–850 kilometers — enough to reach moscow.
Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh reported that the short-range ballistic missile is already in the codification process, while the long-range one is at the final stage.
I want to adjust public expectations. First of all, I am waiting for the ballistic missile to fly to moscow, probably more than all Ukrainians taken together. And I am doing everything within our power to make this happen, 24/7 with our entire team. We have target dates, and we plan to do this by the end of autumn. Specifically, the long-range ballistic missile, which is supposed to reach moscow. We are creating capabilities; we are developing a certain platform capable of flying to moscow. Whether moscow will be selected as the target or not remains a decision for our Armed Forces. Fire Point, as a weapons manufacturer, never selects targets. Fire Point provides the tool, the specific munition that can be used as intended. I would very much like it to be moscow
According to her, the company is currently working on a very accelerated timeline and has been developing ballistic missiles for less than two years, although similar developments previously never took less than 15 years.
This is an important shift in the scale of Ukraine’s defense industry. Drones have already given Ukraine the ability to regularly strike the Russian rear at long distances. Ballistic systems are meant to add a different type of capability — speed, a different flight trajectory, and potentially a significantly larger warhead.
Will this alone be able to stop the war? Not at present. But it directly reduces russia’s ability to wage war
A racing component in a long-range drone: how Fire Point adapted it for the FP-127.09.26, 11:05