After Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine faced the need for mass production of its own rocket engines for new types of weapons—cruise missiles, jet-powered drones, and interceptor drones. Although Ukraine’s engine-building sector was one of the most powerful in the region, before the attack by Russian terrorist forces the country had no market that required thousands of rocket engines. The war radically changed demand, while dependence on imported engines turned from an economic issue into a strategic risk. UNN examined how Ukraine is trying to close this gap.
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Faced with the terror of massive missile strikes on Ukrainian cities, the authorities realized that the only thing the Kremlin responds to is force. To give the enemy a worthy response, Ukraine needed to increase production of its own long-range weapons—missiles and attack UAVs. However, manufacturers encountered the problem of lacking the capacity for mass production of turbojet engines and dependence on imports.
How Ukraine ended up without mass production of turbojet engines
At first glance, the situation is paradoxical. Ukraine inherited a powerful aviation industry, engineering schools, and enterprises from the Soviet Union that had been engaged in engine building for decades. Among them were the well-known "Motor Sich" and "Ivchenko-Progress".
The problem, therefore, was not that the country did not know how to build jet engines. It was the lack of established mass production of engines specifically for the weapons needed for the new war today—missiles, jet-powered UAVs, and interceptors.
Anton Zemlyanyi, a senior analyst at the Ukrainian Center for Security and Cooperation, identifies the complexity of the production itself, financing, an adequate resource base—although it has remained since the Soviet Union—and the ability to scale the technology among the key reasons.
According to him, having the necessary expertise does not yet mean that mass production can be organized quickly. This requires equipment, materials, suppliers, specialists, financing, and protected production facilities.
Another crucial factor must also be taken into account here—the war. Large specialized enterprises are potential targets for Russian strikes, while part of the historically established base of Ukraine’s engine-building industry is located in Zaporizhzhia, which is relatively close to the front.
Therefore, for Ukraine I would identify three main problems: production facilities, which can be hit in wartime conditions; an insufficient resource base; and a shortage of the necessary materials and components
There was no such demand for missiles
There is another reason why mass production of the classes of jet engines needed today was not launched earlier. As experts explain, before the full-scale war Ukraine simply did not have a corresponding market.
Yurii Hudymenko, head of the Anti-Corruption Council under the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, draws attention to the economic component. According to him, investing large sums in establishing serial production is advisable when there is predictable demand for a large number of products.
We have a free market, and before the full-scale war there simply was not sufficient demand in Ukraine for jet engines in such quantities. Objectively, what were they needed for? We do not have our own Boeing or another major aircraft manufacturing industry where thousands of such engines would be needed. Demand was met through purchases from the Czech Republic and China, and until 2014—from Russia as well. That was sufficient for the market that existed
The full-scale war completely changed this economic picture. Ukraine now needs not dozens or even hundreds, but thousands of engines for various types of weapons. It is precisely the scale of the new demand that makes investment in domestic production economically justified.
According to Hudymenko’s estimate, if production were to start completely from scratch, without documentation, specialists, equipment, or financing, creating an industrial base could take about five years. But Ukraine is not starting from scratch: the availability of engineers, technological documentation, production expertise, investment, and guaranteed orders could significantly shorten this process, he is convinced.
Currently, companies manufacturing deep-strike systems are working on their own designs to meet this need. One such project is a proprietary turbojet engine being developed by the Ukrainian company Fire Point. In the future, it could be used on FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The company has already created the engine, is preparing to scale up production, and is testing the first prototypes.
Proprietary engine for the “Flamingo”
As Fire Point CEO Iryna Terekh explained, work on the turbojet engine was carried out jointly with a design bureau that once developed the AI-25 aircraft engine. The AI-25TL modification was used on the first versions of the Flamingo.
From the outset, the missile itself was designed as a platform capable of operating with various power plants. According to Terekh, five different types of engines have already been used during testing.
Development of the proprietary engine took more than six months. Fire Point is currently preparing its production and testing the first prototypes. The company plans to complete testing and the necessary modifications by the end of 2026, after which it will move to mass production.
We are moving toward this; the engine has already been made. Production preparation and testing of the first prototypes are currently under way. It has not yet been used, although there are certain plans and a sequence of actions. In fact, making an engine for such a missile is much more difficult than making the missile itself. This is highly technological, complex production involving a great many “associated suppliers.” But Ukraine’s independence in turbojet engines, especially of this size and class, is a very important strategic capability not only for the company, but for the country
According to her, a number of Ukrainian manufacturers are currently working on various areas in this field, while Fire Point is focusing on engines for large and medium-sized weapons.
Creating an engine is half the battle
Experts emphasize that the main challenge lies not even in developing a functional engine, but in learning to produce them consistently by the thousands—in other words, establishing conveyor-belt production.
The problem is not only creating a single functional engine. It is much more difficult to move to mass production in the quantities required for the war. This requires stable financing, materials, equipment, personnel, technological chains, and protected production facilities
The scale of the need is particularly clear from the example of interceptor drones, which require small turbojet engines.
According to military expert Kostiantyn Kryvolap, if it is necessary to intercept about three thousand Russian drones per month, the number of interceptors themselves must be much greater.
Therefore, the question here is not only whether we can create one good jet engine. The question is whether we can consistently produce thousands of such engines every month. The transition from individual prototypes to mass production is now one of the main challenges
Why jet engines are needed if Ukraine has long-range UAVs
Ukrainian long-range unmanned aerial vehicles with piston engines are already capable of striking targets at considerable distances. However, war constantly demands technological breakthroughs. After all, as strike systems develop, so do the means of intercepting them.
That is precisely why jet propulsion has become the next important area. The significantly greater speed reduces air-defense reaction time and complicates the interception of the target.
At the same time, it should be understood that a jet-powered drone may be more expensive than a conventional one.
“We essentially have two figures: how much money has been spent on the products we are launching, and what share of them actually reached the target. A jet-powered drone will most likely be more expensive than a conventional one. But if its greater speed gives it a significantly higher probability of breaking through Russian air defenses, the economics of using it may prove more favorable,”
At the same time, the difficulty of intercepting targets with jet engines makes their interception more costly and therefore creates an additional burden on the enemy’s economy.
An indigenous engine as insurance against external dependence
Technological sovereignty is no less important. Ukraine can independently create a missile or drone, but if a critically important component can only be imported, its ability to scale depends on an external supplier.
The risks here are obvious: the supplier’s limited production capacity, political decisions by the governments of producer countries, export restrictions, competition for products, logistical problems, or simply a shortage of the required number of engines.
The enemy is also dependent on imported components. However, according to Iryna Terekh, Russia’s access to Chinese turbojet engines currently gives it an advantage in developing jet-powered systems.
At the same time, experts believe that complete independence does not necessarily mean localizing the entire production cycle within Ukraine.
On the contrary, given the threat of Russian strikes, it would be advisable to locate part of the production in partner countries. According to Zemliany, the optimal model could be one in which Ukraine retains key technologies, engineering expertise, and control over the product while, for example, using the resource and industrial base of European partners.
It is precisely this model—combining Ukrainian technologies and engineering expertise with the production capabilities of European partners—that may currently be the most practical way to scale up production
What indigenous jet engines will mean for Ukraine
Serial production of indigenous jet engines will allow Ukraine to develop long-range cruise missiles, high-speed strike UAVs, drone-missiles, and jet-powered interceptors simultaneously.
In addition, the manufacturer will gain control over modernization. If all weapons components are produced within a single technological ecosystem, changing their characteristics will not depend on the capabilities of an external supplier or anyone’s political will.
However, the success of engine manufacturing will depend not only on the manufacturer’s creation of an effective turbopropulsion engine for missiles or drones, but also on the availability of stable, long-term orders that will make it possible to forecast funding and scale up production.
If this transition from prototypes to a production line takes place, Ukraine will be able to close one of the most critical gaps in its own production of missile and unmanned weapons. And then the question will no longer be whether the country is capable of creating its own jet engine, but how many such engines Ukraine’s defense industry can produce each month.