Ukraine will need an even larger army and more assistance from the US and Europe to deter potential Russian aggression when a ceasefire is reached. This is reported by analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), reports UNN.
The US and Europe will likely have to provide military assistance to Ukraine faster, in much larger volumes, and at a higher cost, the closer the final ceasefire lines are to the current front line. Ukraine will likely need even larger armed forces with greater capabilities to play its important role in deterring and, if necessary, repelling future aggression along the current front line (both inside Ukraine and along Ukraine's international border with Russia), which is more than 2,100 kilometers long
ISW analysts note that ensuring a ceasefire along the current front line will also require the involvement of a large number of Western forces.
ISW notes that a ceasefire along more defensible positions would also put Russian forces in a more disadvantageous position to resume offensive operations, reducing the likelihood of future Russian aggression.
ISW notes that the current front lines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine would need to reliably defend against new Russian aggression.
Russian troops are on the other side of the Dnipro River from Kherson, approximately 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia and 30 kilometers from Kharkiv. Russian troops on the Dnipro River could use a ceasefire to prepare for an extremely difficult river crossing, which would significantly increase the likelihood of success in such an attempt
Zelensky believes that it may take more than 30 days to cease fire15.03.25, 17:57 • [views_27985]
ISW notes that stopping a well-prepared large mechanized offensive in war is extremely rare, meaning that a resumption of the Russian assault is likely to almost immediately threaten both Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, as well as key cities in the Donetsk "fortress belt".
Analysts say that Russia is building a large highway and railway aimed at connecting major cities in occupied Ukraine and Russia, which will strengthen Russia's control over occupied Ukraine and Russia's ability to transport and supply Russian forces operating in Ukraine in the event of a future Russian offensive in southern Ukraine.
