The full-scale war in Ukraine has demonstrated that unmanned systems have ceased to be auxiliary elements, and the classic front line with infantry and armored vehicle confrontation is gradually being partially replaced by the so-called "kill zone" — a strip along the line of contact, maximally saturated with reconnaissance and strike drones, where any movement of equipment or people is detected and engaged. If earlier the basis of military power was considered to be tank armies, artillery and aviation, then the Ukrainian experience shows: an increasingly important role is played by unmanned systems, high-precision missiles and long-range weapons, writes UNN.
A new philosophy of warfare is being formed in Ukraine
Just a few years ago, drones were viewed primarily as an auxiliary tool for reconnaissance and fire adjustment. Today they have become one of the main means of conducting combat operations.
Senior Research Fellow at the American Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Kateryna Bondar in a study on the possibility of conducting autonomous warfare concludes that Ukraine is gradually transitioning to a concept of conducting combat operations in which a significant part of the tasks are performed by unmanned and autonomous systems, and the key goal is to minimize risks to personnel.
Ukraine has begun and continues to build a large-scale integrated system that combines FPV drones, strike drones of various types and classes, including "mid-" and "deep strikes", naval drones and ground robotic systems.
The war in Ukraine has already become the "first major war of drones" and is changing military doctrines. In this war, there is less and less room for traditional means of combat. For example, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Pavlo Yelizarov directly stated that between a drone and a tank, he would choose a drone, because "it is more mobile, cheaper, does not depend on terrain, does not get stuck in mud, and requires fewer people to maintain."
Fighters of the 28th Mechanized Brigade named after the Knights of the Winter Campaign destroyed a Russian "monster tank" with the help of UAVs
The massive use of drones has radically changed the very logic of combat operations. If earlier the front was a relatively clear line of contact, today it increasingly resembles a multi-kilometer "kill zone", i.e., a territory where any movement of equipment or personnel is promptly detected and can be engaged. According to expert estimates, this "kill zone" reaches a depth of 10 to 30 kilometers. Conducting classic mechanized operations in this zone is significantly complicated. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported back in early 2026 that in the Kupyansk direction, Ukrainian military personnel, with the help of drones, created a tactical engagement zone that does not allow Russian troops to use equipment within 20-25 kilometers from the front line or use infantry within one kilometer from the front line near Kupyansk. According to data from the military themselves from the "Orion" unit, they can destroy up to 88 percent of Russian forces before they approach Ukrainian positions.
"Kill zones" controlled by UAVs complicate, and in some places make impossible, the formation of strike groups for breaking through the front, because any concentration of equipment is detected and can be destroyed.
Mid-strike: work outside the kill zone
If in the "kill zone" everything that moves near the front line is subject to engagement, then middle strike class strike drones reach what is behind it. The approximate operating distance of such UAVs is from 30 to 300 km.
Drones for medium depth strikes are usually lightweight "deep strikes", capable of carrying up to 200 kg of payload. Ukrainian military personnel actively use such drones to cut logistics arteries, airfields, warehouses, bases, and generally enemy force concentrations. The most indicative strikes of "mid-strikes" were the destruction of bridges that allow the enemy to enter occupied Crimea via a land corridor.
Thus, the military, using middle-strike UAVs of Ukrainian production, struck key Crimean bridges near Chongar and Armyansk. The strikes were carried out using FP-2 and "Behemoth" drones. The bridge connecting the Kherson region with Crimea in Chongar was hit twice – on the night of June 6-7, and also on the night of June 9. Already on June 8, the bridge leading from Henichesk to the Arabat Spit came under attack. Two more bridges across the North Crimean Canal – in the area of the settlements of Preobrazhenka and Myrne near Armyansk – were attacked on June 11. On June 23, the Special Operations Forces announced the destruction of a railway bridge across the North Crimean Canal.
As told in the Center for Multi-Domain Operations "Phalanx", for similar purposes they actively use "mid-strikes" from Fire Point. Notably, their FP-2 drone, which is exactly what is used for medium-depth strikes, received important upgrades in a fairly short period: now it is capable of carrying more payload, and in addition, the flight range was increased (up to 370 km). The upgrade also makes it possible to use this drone not just as a strike UAV, but also as a platform for launching FPV drones and unguided aircraft rockets, and this makes the attack larger-scale and complicates the enemy's response to it.
It is expected that the range of the "mid-strike" operating zone will expand over time, while they will retain the ability to carry a sufficiently powerful warhead. But even now, such drones effectively suppress the enemy's offensive potential, destroy logistics, fuel and ammunition supplies.
Deep strike: strikes where the enemy felt safe
While mid-strikes destroy logistics at the operational depth, long-range drones (deep strike) work against the enemy's strategic rear. The main targets in the enemy's rear are oil refining industry facilities, factories working for the defense industry, and, as we have seen in recent days, space communication centers.
The first Ukrainian strike at long range occurred back in December 2022 - the Engels-2 airbase at a distance of 650 km was hit, and on May 3, 2023, on the territory of the russian village of Volna on the Taman Peninsula, an oil depot caught fire after being hit by a Ukrainian drone. But the number and range of such strikes was initially impressive, but not as painful for the enemy as one would have liked. In 2025, Ukraine began to increase both the frequency of such strikes and their range. In 2026, "deep strikes" on enemy territory are becoming almost a daily routine.
The attack on the Moscow oil refinery on June 18 is an example of such work: according to a military man who participated in the operation, every drone that reached the target is, in essence, another dozen drones that did not reach it, since it was necessary to suppress several echelons of air defense beforehand. The Ukrainians succeeded in this.
But Moscow is a target, albeit symbolic, but not the most indicative for understanding the scale of the work of "long-range sanctions" – on June 20, Deep Strike units of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine struck the Tyumen oil refinery – the drones successfully covered about 2,500 kilometers to the target. These were modernized long-range FP-1 drones from Fire Point, which are expected to be able to cover a distance of over 3,000 kilometers.
In just a few years, "deep strikes" have already advanced from a distance of 650 km to over two and a half thousand. And, obviously, this is not the limit. Under such conditions – even not thanks to classic or modernized missiles, but precisely to strike drones – there may soon be no safe territory left in russia.
The combination of middle strike and deep strike, according to experts, makes it possible to simultaneously slow down the russian offensive with strikes on logistics on the battlefield and undermine the economic potential of the russian federation with strikes on the production of fuel and weapons in the deep rear.
The economics of war are changing
Experts point out that unmanned systems are becoming one of the highest priority areas of defense investment. Of course, traditional types of heavy weapons are not disappearing completely, but mathematics is a stubborn thing. A simple calculation: one russian tank costs, depending on the model, from 1.2 to 4.5 million dollars, even if it takes 5-7 strike drones to destroy it, their total cost will be significantly lower than the destroyed target. And also the operator controlling the UAV can be at a relatively far distance from the strike site.
Even drones that cost not tens, but hundreds of thousands of dollars, are economically justified, because the targets they hit are even more expensive. And even cheap drones became a problem for the enemy when they began to be shot down by expensive missiles. The most indicative was the confrontation with the Iranian "Shahed" drones - when these UAVs were shot down by scarce and expensive Patriot PAC-3 missiles.
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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Allied Forces in Europe General John Stringer called the use of expensive missiles against cheap drones an "unsustainable approach": according to his estimate, one "Shahed" costs from 20 to 50 thousand dollars, while a Patriot PAC-3 missile for its interception costs about 3.7 million dollars. He adds that the West's response must "be on the right part of the cost curve," otherwise the traditional air defense architecture, relying on expensive missiles and fighters, simply will not withstand the massive use of cheap drones. But Ukraine already had an answer – interceptor drones costing several thousand dollars.
The sum of these trends adds up to a simple military-economic formula. A tank, artillery system or aircraft remain powerful tools, but their effectiveness on the modern battlefield has fallen in proportion to how much the radius and density of drone coverage has increased. The drones themselves, depending on the types, have become those means that are capable of performing various tasks: restraining the enemy's offensive, undermining its logistics and production base.