The transfer of critical repair documentation for Mi-8MT(MTV) helicopters to a foreign company with a "Russian trace" has become one of the most dangerous decisions in the aviation sector in recent years. UNN investigated how to protect Ukraine and whether sanctions should be imposed against a company with hidden ties to the Russian Federation.
In August 2025, the State Aviation Service of Ukraine granted AAL Group Ltd (UAE) the right to support repair documentation for Mi-8MT(MTV) helicopters. Following public statements about AAL Group's possible ties to the Russian military-industrial complex, and in view of the company's documented status as an "unsuitable vendor" on the Unsuitable Vendor List of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) as of May 28, 2024, the government temporarily suspended the head of the State Aviation Service, Oleksandr Bilchuk, and launched an official investigation that will last until November 10. However, despite this, the company with a "Russian trace," AAL Group Ltd, still has access to the repair documentation for Ukrainian Mi-8MT(MTV) helicopters.
It should be noted that a company is deemed "unsuitable" in accordance with USTRANSCOM Instruction 5200.05 (Foreign Entity Vetting), which provides for the assessment of factors such as: security risks, opaque ownership structure, potential ties to defense-industrial structures of adversary states, sanction risks, and compliance violations.
And the fact that AAL Group Ltd, registered in the UAE, has direct ties to the Russian concern "Rostec," and some of its top management have Russian passports, was stated in early September from the rostrum of the Verkhovna Rada by MP, member of the National Security Committee Fedir Venislavsky.
"The State Aviation Service of Ukraine granted AAL Group Ltd the right to support repair documentation for Mi-8MT(MTV) helicopters. This decision jeopardizes the operation of Mi-8MT(MTV) by all components of the security and defense sector. According to my information, the ultimate beneficiaries of AAL Group Ltd are the company "Russian Helicopters." And many senior managers of this company have Russian passports," said Fedir Venislavsky.
Military expert Oleh Zhdanov believes that in order to prevent such situations from happening again, the Ukrainian government needs to define clear selection criteria for companies that will be granted access to sensitive information.
"The government should develop clear criteria for the reliability of a company. There should be a completely transparent procedure for selecting a company. So that the entire history of the company, its ultimate beneficiary, is visible. And accordingly, whoever does not meet these criteria, whoever does not provide the necessary information, is not allowed. Then there will be no such situations as today," Zhdanov commented.
In addition, it is important that companies are checked for inclusion in the so-called "black lists" by other countries. In such a case, cooperation with AAL Group Ltd would immediately become impossible, as in 2024, the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) recognized the company with a "Russian trace" as unsuitable for cooperation, citing security risks and an opaque ownership structure.
Political scientist Taras Zahorodnii shares a similar opinion. He believes that the SBU should carefully check companies that gain access to sensitive information, as this could create a direct threat of data leakage to Russian special services.
"This is a matter of counterintelligence activity. The SBU should be working on this. That is, there must be a procedure for obtaining information in order to clearly understand: whether this information can be disclosed, how it will affect national security. Are there alternatives, are there more reliable partners who can do this. We need to look for clean, reliable partners," said Taras Zahorodnii.
Therefore, as long as AAL Group Ltd continues to have access to the repair documentation for Ukrainian Mi-8MT(MTV) helicopters, this poses a direct risk to Ukraine's defense capabilities. That is why the AAL case should become a starting point for updating state procedures for accessing sensitive aviation information: transparent selection of contractors, checking sanction and departmental "black lists," mandatory disclosure of ultimate beneficiaries, and repeated audit checks – these are not bureaucracy, but elements of security that should be accompanied by a public risk assessment and answers to key questions of society, so that sensitive data remains under control and works for defense capabilities, not against them.