The number of Chinese components in Russian weapons has almost tripled since 2023. The supply of components, materials, and means of production from China, bypassing sanctions, allows Russia to increase its capabilities in the production of UAVs and other weapons, which leads to the intensification of massive strikes on Ukraine.
This was reported by UNN by Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Commissioner of the President of Ukraine for Sanctions Policy.
The situation with Chinese components in Russian weapons
The number of Chinese components in Russian weapons is undoubtedly growing. As of September 2023, Shahed UAVs contained an average of 11 Chinese-made components. By January 2025, a downed Shahed had 29 Chinese components – an almost threefold increase.
Vlasiuk noted that Western components are also being replaced by Chinese ones.
Western components are being replaced by Chinese analogues. For example, in the Shahed, the programmable logic integrated circuit of the American company AMD Xilinx has been replaced by the Chinese Beijing Microelectronics Technology Institute. In the Kalibr missile, imported microchips from Altera, AMD, Cypress Semiconductor, Analog Devices are being replaced by Russian components, which are actually, most likely, manufactured in China.
According to him, Chinese components are also found in new Russian weapons – the S8000 "Banderol" cruise missile, the V2U loitering munition with artificial intelligence, and the "Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky" fiber-optic UAV.
Thus, the supply of components, materials, and means of production from China, bypassing sanctions, allows Russia to increase its capabilities in the production of UAVs and other weapons, which leads to the intensification of massive strikes on Ukraine.
How to counteract the increase of Chinese components in Russian weapons?
Vlasiuk emphasized that Ukraine is communicating with the Chinese side regarding the situation with components.
We are communicating with the Chinese side, providing information about recorded supplies of critical components and intermediary companies involved in this. We emphasize that the supply of components used in lethal weapons is essentially little different from the supply of lethal weapons as such to the Russian Federation.
He emphasized that to combat this, sanctions pressure must be increased.
This involves systematic work on sanctioning intermediary companies, as well as banking institutions involved in making payments. Also, supplementing the list of critical components. The experience of previous sanctions has shown that the Chinese financial sector takes the risks of falling under sanctions seriously, so imposing sanctions against the most active facilitators of payments from the Russian Federation will encourage the rest of the Chinese banks to comply with the sanctions regime.