As of today, the 40-day term of the operation that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy defined on June 25 for the SBU as an "operation of influence on the aggressor state to induce it to end the war" has ended. Although there is no final official report yet, the interim results of the campaign can already be assessed. During this time, Ukrainian forces have carried out dozens of strikes on military airfields, oil refining infrastructure, air defense systems, logistics, and military facilities in Russia.
Whether the goal was achieved and what effect this campaign already has for Russia — in an exclusive comment to UNN, military expert Ivan Stupak said.
40 days of pressure on Russia — what was accomplished
On June 25, the President of Ukraine announced the start of a 40-day campaign by the SBU together with other Defense Forces, the main stated goal of which was to increase pressure on the aggressor state and induce it to end the war. In fact, it was not about one special operation, but a comprehensive campaign that included strikes on oil and gas infrastructure, military airfields, air defense systems, logistics, military-industrial complex facilities, ships and support vessels, as well as economic and psychological pressure on Russia's rear.
According to open data and official reports from the Ukrainian side, during this period at least six oil refineries, about ten other fuel infrastructure facilities, military airfields, hangars with drones, air defense systems, combat aircraft, support vessels, and FSB facilities were hit. A separate direction was the sanctions and law enforcement pressure on the Russian "shadow fleet," which included more than a hundred vessels.
The most tangible consequence of the campaign is precisely the strikes on fuel infrastructure. In a number of Russian regions, a gasoline shortage arose, multi-hour queues formed at gas stations, and the Russian authorities were forced to publicly acknowledge problems with the supply of fuel.
It is important to note that the given results primarily concern operations that the SBU officially reported. In fact, the overall list of Russian facilities hit during this period is much broader, because simultaneously strikes on the territory of the Russian Federation were also carried out by the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Unmanned Systems Forces, the Air Force, and other components of the Defense Forces of Ukraine, and in addition, some successful operations are not publicly disclosed at all for security reasons.
However, if the campaign is assessed by its main stated political goal — to force Russia to end the war — this has not yet happened.
"We immediately understood that in 40 days Russia would not be forced to peace"
Despite the completion of the first stage of the campaign, Ivan Stupak believes that expecting the end of the war solely due to this operation was unrealistic from the very beginning.
"We understood from the very beginning that after the end of 40 days, the probability that the Russian Federation would be forced to peace is practically zero. For this, we would have needed some absolutely breakthrough tool," Stupak said.
According to him, the campaign cannot be considered separately from other actions of the Ukrainian defense forces.
"This is not one isolated operation. This is part of a large systematic work. Here are the strikes of the SBU, and the operations of the HUR, and the work of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and actions in the near and deep rear of the enemy. Only in combination can all these elements gradually exhaust Russia and create increasingly bigger problems for it," the expert noted.
The most massive strikes of the SBU and other units of the Defense Forces
June 27 – strike on the oil pumping station "Vtorovo" in the Vladimir region of the Russian Federation, which provides fuel to Moscow and export ports. The defense forces hit the "Titan-Barricades" plant in Volgograd — a manufacturer of launchers for "Iskander-M" and "Topol-M". A Flamingo Fire Point missile hit the plant.
June 28 – the "Slavyansky" oil refinery in the Krasnodar region was hit — ignition of tanks and the processing unit was recorded.
July 1 – the military airfield "Saki" in Crimea was attacked, with confirmed hits on hangars containing Su-30 and Su-30SM fighters. Also struck was JSC "Research Institute of Physical Measurements" — a Roscosmos enterprise in the Penza region that produces sensors for "Iskander", "Kalibr" and Kh-101 missiles.
July 2 – the strike hit the Nizhny Novgorod oil refinery at a distance of 850 km from the border.
July 3 — another strike on the "Saki" airfield (seven hangars with Su-30SM, Su-30 and Su-24 were hit), as well as an attack on hangars with "Shaheds" at the "Gvardeyskoye" airfield.
July 4 – FP-1 drone strikes hit the "Saint Petersburg" oil terminal and the "Kronstadt" base of the Baltic Fleet in the Leningrad region.
July 6 – a massive attack on the Yaroslavl oil refinery, an oil loading terminal in Vysotsk (Leningrad region), and the "First Plant" oil refinery in the Kaluga region. Also, modernized FP-1 drones hit the Omsk oil refinery at a distance of 3000 km.
July 8 – the "Dzhankoy" air base and the infrastructure of the "Crimea" port were hit; on the same day, the Sea Baby naval drone struck the Russian "shadow fleet" tanker "Blue" near Yalta. Defense forces hit the Saratov oil refinery and "TAIF-NK".
July 9 – strikes on the "Red Star" oil depots in the Tver region and "Stavropolskaya" in the Stavropol region.
July 11 – the "Syzran" oil refinery was hit.
July 13 – the oil terminal in the port of "Kavkaz" and an oil depot in the Stavropol Krai were hit.
July 17 – a strategic Tu-95 bomber was destroyed at the "Engels" airfield.
July 20 – drones struck the FSB coordination center in a boarding house in the Kherson region, where about a hundred occupiers were staying.
July 24 - strikes hit the "Subkhankulovo" linear production and dispatch station in Bashkortostan at a distance of 1350 km, the "1st Plant" enterprise, and the "Nebo-U" radar station at the "Belbek" airfield.
July 25 – in the Caspian Sea, the "Molniya" missile boat, two cargo ships, and an oil production platform were hit.
July 29 – the strike hit the primary processing unit of one of the largest refineries — "Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez", located more than 1,500 km from Ukraine.
July 31 - jointly with the Defense Forces, the Yevpatoria aircraft plant, the port of Taman, and one of the largest refineries in the Russian Federation, the Volgograd refinery, were struck.
August 1 a strike on a cluster of three refineries in Ufa — "Bashneft-UNPZ", "Bashneft-Novoil" and "Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim" at a distance of 1,600 km, as well as on four radar stations in the Krasnodar Territory.
Painful strikes – aviation and air defense
Speaking about the results of the campaign, Stupak specifically highlighted strikes on Russian combat aviation.
"Personally, I was most impressed by the information about the destruction of two Su-35 aircraft. This is a very serious result. Even if they were not completely destroyed, but only damaged, that's already minus two combat vehicles. These are not new planes from the factory, but equipment that has been in service for a long time, with trained crews and refined operational algorithms. It's like a car: one thing is a new one from the showroom, another is one that is already perfectly tuned to its owner. For Russia, such losses are very tangible," he explained.
The expert considers strikes on air defense systems to be no less important.
"We see the methodical destruction of Russian air defense systems. And the logic here is very simple - the fewer air defense systems Russia has, the more chances our long-range drones have to pass unnoticed to the target and strike. This is gradual work that directly affects the effectiveness of subsequent operations," Stupak emphasized.
Can official figures be trusted
The expert believes that there is currently no reason to doubt the official reports of the Ukrainian side regarding the strikes on Russian targets.
"So far, we have not seen any reason to say that Ukrainian official structures are exaggerating their results. Most strikes are confirmed by photo and video materials. These are not stories in the style of 'take our word for it.' Moreover, earlier the Ministry of Defense explained that only those results that have confirmation - photos, videos, geolocation - are included in the official statistics. If there is no such confirmation, the object is not included in the overall statistics," he noted.
At the same time, according to Stupak, one should not underestimate Russia's ability to recover losses.
"We must understand that Russia is also adapting. Western analysts recently noted that in recent years, Russian aviation has practically compensated for its aircraft losses. A similar situation exists with air defense. Russia is a huge country, and it can transfer systems from the Far East, northern regions, or other directions. That is why the destruction of one or even several systems does not mean an immediate collapse of the entire air defense system. But it forces Russia to spend additional resources, move equipment, weaken other regions, and gradually exhaust its reserves," the military expert concluded.
Fuel, logistics, and Crimea - how systematic strikes are gradually exhausting the Russian army
Separately, the expert drew attention to another direction that, in his opinion, remains one of the most important in the SBU's campaign - systematic strikes on Russia's fuel infrastructure and logistics. This component of the operation has a cumulative effect, as it forces the enemy to spend more and more resources on ensuring the army's operations and to redeploy forces to protect critical facilities in the rear.
"I am generally in favor of striking logistics as much as possible. Wars are won not only on the front line. They are also won when the enemy cannot deliver fuel, ammunition, spare parts on time, and cannot properly supply its troops. If we constantly knock out oil depots, refineries, and fuel terminals, this creates huge problems for Russia. They are forced to reroute, repair damaged facilities, and deploy additional security forces. These are enormous expenditures of time, money, and resources," Stupak explained.
According to him, strikes on temporarily occupied Crimea, which remains one of the key logistics hubs for the Russian military grouping, are of particular importance.
"Crimea for Russians is a huge military hub. The peninsula serves as a supply route for troops in southern Ukraine. That is why strikes on airfields, warehouses, fuel infrastructure, and air defense systems in Crimea are extremely important. The more problems arise there, the harder it is for Russians to supply their troops at the front. And this is a result that is not always immediately visible, but it accumulates over time," the military expert noted.
He emphasized that it is the systematic pressure on the enemy's logistics that can have a much longer-lasting effect than striking individual military objects.
"Russia is capable of producing a new tank or repairing individual equipment. But when logistics begins to suffer systematically, fuel shortages occur, routes need to be changed, air defense systems need to be moved to the rear, and every important object needs to be guarded – this creates a completely different level of problems for the enemy. It is precisely such operations that gradually exhaust the enemy," Stupak concluded.
The main effect of the campaign
Despite the fact that Russia has not ceased hostilities, the campaign has already achieved another strategic goal – it has forced the enemy to constantly react to Ukrainian strikes. Russia is forced to move air defense systems to the rear, repair oil refineries, restore logistics, strengthen the protection of military airfields, and spend more and more resources on defending its own territory instead of using them directly at the front.
This very effect is the main result of the first 40 days of the campaign, which, most likely, will not end with the expiration of the announced term, but will become part of a long-term strategy to exhaust Russia's military and economic potential.
Президент Володимир Зеленський вже заявив, що вже погодив нові операції для Служби безпеки на серпень. Це означає, що атаки триватимуть.